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Expansion and validation of the Political Skill Inventory (PSI): An examination of the link between charisma, political skill, and performance

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Expansion and Validation of the Political Skill Inventory (PSI): An Examination of the
Link Between Charisma, Political Skill, and Performance

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
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Note to the Reader

Note to the Reader: The original of this document contains color that is necessary for understanding the data. The original dissertation is on file with the USF library in Tampa, FL.

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ABSTRACT

The present research was developed to reexamine the factor structure of the Political Skill Inventory (PSI), expand upon the political skill behavioral taxonomy to include charisma, and provide validity evidence for both the PSI and our new measure of charisma. In study one, using a large undergraduate student sample, confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence for a three factor structure of political skill. Charisma and networking ability were identified as unique factors of the political skill construct domain while PSI dimensions of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and apparent sincerity collapsed to form a single dimension. Study One results also indicated a strong positive relationship between self-reports of political skill, charisma, and OCB.

In Study Two, using a sample of public-sector triads consisting of professional level employees, their coworkers and their supervisors, mixed support was found for the convergent and divergent validity of the four PSI dimensions and charisma across reporting sources. As hypothesized, political skill predicted supervisor reports of overall job performance, task performance, and OCB. Charisma contributed to the prediction of supervisor ratings of overall performance and task performance after controlling for PSI total scores. At the dimensional level, social astuteness and charisma demonstrated the

strongest predictive validity across all study criteria. Social astuteness and charisma also demonstrated a significant interaction when predicting supervisor ratings of overall performance and task performance. This interaction indicated that social astuteness plays more of a role in predicting job performance for employees low in charisma than for employees high in charisma. As an addition to the second study, the ability of the PSI and charisma to predict performance ratings was compared against an abridged version of a situational judgment test assessing practical intelligence, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM; Wagner and Sternberg, 1991). After controlling for PSI total scores and charisma, the TKIM provided a modest contribution to the prediction of supervisor ratings of overall performance. Implications of these findings and directions for future research are provided.

Introduction

Background on Organizational Politics & Political Behavior

Since the early 1970's, interest in organizational politics has been rapidly growing. The increasing presence of ambiguous and dynamic work environments has forced organizations and managers to adopt new approaches to resolving business problems. Environmental uncertainties have necessitated a shift in the way business is conducted and how most organizations are structured and operated (Cascio, 1995). Advances in technology and a prevalence of industries focused on product improvement, specialization, information sharing, and customer service have often made traditional systems of business obsolete. *Old-fashion* mechanistic organizations, limited in their ability to cope with turbulent business conditions, are espousing more *organic* structures that place emphasis on the use of human and intellectual capital in meeting organizational goals. These organizations have flatter hierarchies, are less formal, and are more flexible in addressing complex work problems with seemingly ambiguous resolutions (Daft, 2004). To cope with changes in organizational environments and structures, organizational politics have become recognized as an important and necessary channel through which power is distributed, decisions are made, and work goals are realized (Pfeffer 1981; 1992). Echoing the words of Pfeffer, we feel that in many cases organizational politics are the *best* and *only* way to resolve work conflicts or make organizational decisions.

Salancik & Pfeffer's (1977) interpretation of the strategic-contingency model of power helped fuel the rising interest in how politics affect workers and organizations. These authors have suggested that the distribution of organizational power is contingent upon the problems most consequential to the organization's survival. Accordingly, managers can gain power by obtaining control of critical work activities and exploiting ways of completing these activities through the use of social capital (i.e. other people). In response to this theory, concerns have been raised over the misuse or abuse of power within organizations and the use of manipulative or deceptive political behaviors to gain power. Wary of exploitation, researchers warned against the *dark side* of political behavior (Ferris & King, 1991). Accordingly, political behavior began taking on a negative connotation and was perceived by most organizations or HR administrators as behavior to be discouraged.

Apprehension over the deceptive and debilitating role of organizational political behavior led to disagreements regarding the definition of the phenomenon. Several of the literature's emerging definitions referred to political behavior as self-serving or testing the ethical or procedural boundaries of an organization (Culbert & McDonough, 1980; Farrell & Paterson, 1982; Ferris, Fedor, & King, 1994; Mayes & Allen, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981). Only recently have theorists considered political behaviors as being motivated by desires for improved outcomes for the self or for the organization (Ferris, Perrewe, Anthony, & Gilmore, 2000). We take the perspective that political behavior can be performed to achieve self, group, and organizational level objectives and that these objectives are not always mutually exclusive. Furthermore, we contend that regardless of

the targeted outcomes, political behavior can be executed in a style that may or may not preserve ethical or procedural standards of an organization. Rather than politics being inherently manipulative or expedient, we argue that managers must make the choice whether or not to use politics for appropriate purposes and also choose whether or not to execute them in an a manner that is perceived as preserving the social or procedural norms of a context.

A second clarification we would like to make regarding the definition of political behavior concerns the audiences these behaviors are targeted to influence. We contend that political behavior can be exercised up, down, and laterally across the chain-of-command. Likewise, we believe these behaviors can be used to influence others within the organization to which an employee belongs, or across organizations with which an employee interacts. In other words, we believe that employees can use political behaviors to influence supervisors, subordinates, or lateral colleagues within their own organization, and they can also use these behaviors to influence workers spanning all levels of external organizations with which they routinely conduct business. We believe that political behaviors are appropriate for any situation where the influence of others, regardless of their relative rank or organizational membership, has the potential to result in desired outcomes. It should be noted, however, that the selection and expression of political behaviors may vary greatly depending on the status and association of the individual an employee is attempting to influence.

Political Behavior as Political Skill

Academics and practitioners, alike, are beginning to frame politics in a more positive light. A building block for this shift was laid nearly 50 years ago with Thompson and Tuden's (1959) quadratic-categorization of decision situations. These authors proposed that the way decisions are made is contingent upon the agreement over organizational goals and how these goals should be realized. According to their model, with exception to situations where there is full agreement over *what to do* and *how to do it*, attempts to influence or the use politics will always emerge when decisions are being made.

Pfeffer (1981) expanded on the work of Thompson and Tuden with his theoretical modeling of the conditions producing the use of power and politics in organizations. Pfeffer's model contends that the use of politics in organizations is the response to conflicts over important decisions when there is a dispersion of power across decision makers. He argues that conflict will arise when resources are scarce, organizational units are interdependent, or there are discrepancies in work goals across units or departments. In such situations, managers need to use politics to lobby for access to resources or for decision-making power. Pfeffer asserts that when the conditions of his model are met, "the use of power is virtually inevitable and furthermore, it is the only way to arrive at a decision" (pg. 70). Consequently, those managers with the will and the skill to use politics are most likely to achieve their personal and/or organizational goals.

It is difficult to imagine any organization where employees agree over all work decisions and where power is distributed from a single autocratic source. Attempting to

minimize major conflicts regarding the fairness of resource distribution is a healthy goal for any organization; however, it is overly optimistic to believe organizations can avoid all conflicts that trigger the expression of political behavior. Accordingly, the inescapable presence of political environments within organizations creates the demand to focus on *how* politics are executed rather than focusing only on how to minimize, condemn, or avoid them. A shift in how we conceptualize the use of politics must be supplemented with a shift in how we measure, acknowledge, reward, and train political behavior.

Answering this call, Ferris and his colleagues (1999) have initiated a line of research treating the appropriate use of political behaviors as a skill-set indicative of good performance and successful outcomes rather than as actions detrimental to organizational functioning. These researchers define political skill as: “The ability to effectively understand others at work, and to use such knowledge to influence others to act in ways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives” (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Douglas, & Ammeter, 2004: 311). Acknowledgement of political behavior as a skill-set and a viable business tool has opened many doors for HR interventions that were not explored while politics remained stigmatized as an organizational ailment. By identifying and encouraging desired political behaviors, HR administrators can use the assessment of political skill for purposes of recruitment, selection, training, and managerial development.

The Political Skill Inventory (PSI) was developed to target four key dimensions of desired political behaviors: social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking ability,

and apparent sincerity (Ferris et al., 2005). The PSI is an expansion of a unidimensional, six-item measure of political skill introduced by Ferris et al. (1999) focusing primarily on the diagnosis of political audiences and self-efficacy with building rapport. After stringent item-reduction procedures and confirmatory factor-analysis methodology, the PSI has emerged as a four-factor 18-item measure providing a detailed assessment of the political skill construct domain. The first two dimensions of political skill, social astuteness and interpersonal influence, assess an individual's ability to read and understand social situations and select the most appropriate and influential behavioral strategies to suit those situations. These elements of political skill are similar to the characteristics of social intelligence. Researchers studying the applications of social intelligence argue that effective leaders need to exercise social perceptiveness and behavioral flexibility when dealing with social interactions in the workplace (Zaccaro, Gilbert, Thor, & Mumford, 1991). In other words, good managers need to be able to discriminate between social contexts and know how to *monitor* behavior depending on the demands of a specific context.

Diagnosing situations and selecting suitable behavior does well to describe the *ability* component of political skill. The final two dimensions of political skill, networking ability and apparent sincerity, assess how this ability is utilized to achieve positive outcomes for the individual or organization. Politically skilled individuals are said to be *masters of the quid pro quo*, accomplished in the art of negotiation, deal making, coalition building, and conflict resolution (Ferris et al., 2005). Pfeffer (1992) argues that successful managers strategically position themselves within the

communication network, develop powerful allies, and build rapport with those who have access to resources. All of these behaviors are focused on the maintenance of networks and are geared toward increasing resources through the sharing of assets and cooperation of powerful individuals. Networking with supervisors, coworkers, and outside constituents is the most overt political behavior observed in managers. In fact, networking ability correlates more strongly with managerial influence tactics including upward appeal (i.e. obtaining the support of individuals higher up in the organizational hierarchy; $r = .30$), coalition building (i.e. obtaining the support of subordinates or coworkers to reinforce a position taken or a request for resources; $r = .31$), and assertiveness (i.e. demanding, ordering, setting deadlines, and checking up on others in order to exercise influence; $r = .18$) than the other dimensions of the PSI (Ferris et al., 2005).

Politically skilled individuals enhance their ability to build connections, coalitions, and alliances by appearing to be sincere and genuine in their intentions and aspirations. Apparent sincerity could be coined the *execution* or *delivery* factor of political skill. Appropriate influence tactics or political behaviors will only be successful to the extent they are perceived as being genuine and devoid of personal motives or hidden agendas. Followers and collaborators, alike, will be more likely to increase their commitment to an idea or be influenced by an individual when they feel they are not being manipulated or bullied. An employee perceived as being insincere will be less successful in political interactions regardless of how well he reads situations and understands what behavioral strategies are most effective across different contexts.

Using a four factor model, the PSI combines elements of several social effectiveness constructs (e.g. social intelligence, self-monitoring, tacit knowledge, emotional intelligence, ego-resiliency, social self-efficacy, and self-monitoring) into a concise 18-item measurement of political behavior (Ferris, Perrewé, Anthony, & Gilmore, 2000). Politically skilled individuals exercise what Culbert (1996) refers to as a *mind-set orientation* in determining how to interact with those they wish to influence. Politically skilled managers build lasting relationships with stakeholders and influence audiences with diverse interests by analyzing political arenas, choosing strategies aligned with audience expectations and styles, and by demonstrating behavioral flexibility and genuineness in the execution of these strategies.

Validation Evidence for the PSI

The first step in determining the utility of a new measure is to examine how well it converges with similar constructs and discriminates from different constructs, and to test how well it predicts organizational outcomes. Given that political skill is a relatively new construct to the I/O and organizational behavior literature, there hasn't been an abundance of validation research conducted using the PSI. However, the research that does exist has consistently found positive results regarding the divergence of the PSI from other measures of social skill or intellectual abilities and its ability to predict job performance (Ahearn et al., 2004; Ferris et al., 2005; Semadar, Robins & Ferris, 2006).

A major concern regarding the uniqueness of any social effectiveness measure is the extent to which it diverges from general mental ability (GMA). The meta-analytical work of Hunter and Hunter (1984) solidified general intelligence as the highest order

predictor of job performance with reports of a corrected mean correlation of .51 between the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) and overall performance for a cumulative sample of approximately 32,000 employees across 512 job classifications. To satisfy critics of social effectiveness and practical intelligence measures (e.g. Schmidt & Hunter, 1993), these types of scales need to demonstrate weak correlations with GMA. The divergence of political skill from GMA was first evidenced by Ferris et al. (1999) when these researchers found a negative, nonsignificant correlation ($r = -.08$) between the six-item measure of political skill and a measure of GMA. To our knowledge, research using the 18-item PSI has yet to report how the scale correlates with GMA. Although it is beyond the scope of the current proposal, more research is needed to replicate the divergence of political skill from GMA that was demonstrated by the 6-item scale.

Ferris et al. (2005) reported modest correlations between PSI total scores and an array of variables falling under the umbrella of personality and social effectiveness including self-monitoring ($r = .39$), conscientiousness ($r = .31$), trait anxiety ($r = -.31$), and political savvy ($r = .47$). These authors also reported low to modest correlations between PSI total scores and three of Kipnis et al.'s (1980) influence tactics including reports of upward appeal ($r = .25$), efforts to build coalitions ($r = .21$), and assertiveness ($r = .09$). While these correlations suggest some construct overlap with political skill, the relationships are sufficiently weak to dismiss concerns of construct redundancy.

There have been relatively few criterion-related validity studies assessing the ability of the PSI to predict job performance. In a sample of public-sector casework teams, Ahearn et al. (2004) showed that leader political skill, measured using the

unidimensional 6-item scale, was correlated significantly with an objective measure of team performance ($r = .19$) and accounted for an additional 3% of the performance variance after controlling for several variables including team member experience and leader experience. Similarly, using the short scale, Higgins (2000) reported a positive link between political skill and recruitment interviewer ratings and evaluations of job applicants.

Since the expansion of the PSI to four dimensions and 18 items, researchers have reported stronger relationships between political skill and performance measures. Semadar, Robbins, and Ferris (2006) reported a correlation of .34 between PSI self-reports and supervisory ratings of job performance in a sample of 400 managers from a large Australian automotive manufacturer. More importantly, this study demonstrated that PSI self-reports accounted for 85% of the variance explained in performance when self-monitoring, emotional intelligence, and leadership self-efficacy were also included as predictors in the regression model. In a different study, Ferris et al. (2005) reported significant R^2 's when regressing effectiveness ratings and job performance ratings on PSI total scores using two samples spanning public and private sectors of industry. Although the criterion-related validity research for the PSI is limited due to the infancy of the construct, the existing research provides initial support for the PSI's ability to predict job performance. A goal of the current research was to further validate the predictive utility of the PSI by examining the link between political skill and multi-source reports of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and task performance.

Political Skill & Tacit Knowledge

Indeed, given the limited number of existing studies, more validation research is needed to provide additional evidence of the PSI's value as a selection or development tool. Existing research has shown the PSI to outperform several measures of social effectiveness including emotional intelligence, self-monitoring, and leadership self-efficacy in the prediction of job performance (Semadar, Robbins, & Ferris, 2006). However, researchers have yet to compare the predictive power of the PSI against a measure of tacit knowledge. In light of Ferris et al's (2000) claim that tacit knowledge is explained within the parameters of political skill, the PSI should converge with tacit knowledge as well as compliment its ability to predict job performance. To examine this hypothesis, our second study competitively tested the predictive power of the PSI against that of a well-validated measure of practical intelligence, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM) (Wagner & Sternberg, 1991).

Tacit knowledge is defined as "practical know-how that rarely is expressed openly or taught directly" (Oxford University Dictionary, 1933; taken from Wagner & Sternberg, 1991, p. 1). The construct, popularly referred to as *street smarts*, has been categorized into three distinct managerial dimensions: an employee's ability to manage the self, manage tasks, and manage coworkers. The dimensions of self and coworker management draw similarities with the construct of political skill. Wagner and Sternberg (1990) argue that managers high on practical intelligence understand self motives and organizational strategies, and have an extensive knowledge of how to *finesse* subordinates, peers, and supervisors. Similarly, politically skilled individuals use

information about themselves, their coworkers, and work contexts to choose and execute effective political behaviors.

The TKIM has been shown to predict supervisor ratings of performance (r 's = .29-.56) in several studies using diverse academic and business samples (Wagner & Sternberg, 1991). In a sample of business executives, Wagner and Sternberg (1990) reported that the TKIM was the single best predictor of performance on a managerial simulation, accounting for an additional 32% of the variance in performance after controlling for GMA. Tacit knowledge researchers have consistently shown divergence of the TKIM from measures of general mental ability or verbal reasoning (r 's = .02-.30) using academic, managerial, and military samples (Hedlund, Forsyth, Horvath, Williams, Snook, & Sternberg, 2003; Wagner & Sternberg, 1990; Wagner & Sternberg, 1991).

Tacit knowledge and political skill theorists alike have argued for the importance of experience or reputation in predicting the acquisition and successful expression of the two constructs (Wagner & Sternberg, 1990; Ferris, Perrewé, & Douglas, 2002). However, only the TKIM has been shown to correlate significantly ($r = .30$) with managerial experience (Wagner & Sternberg, 1991). This may be because the mechanisms through which time and experience influence these variables are quite different. It could be argued that tacit knowledge is learned implicitly or *informally* as workers experience increasingly diverse contexts and are forced to make decisions across different situations. Political skill, on the other hand, may only develop over time if an individual's reputation as being resourceful and cooperative is established. Ferris, Perrewé, and Douglas (2002) argue that the progression of a manager's reputation as an

important and fair player, maintaining rapport with coworkers will ultimately result in more opportunities requiring the use of political skill. While tacit knowledge places emphasis on the role of work experiences, political skill focuses only on those experiences where employees are required to negotiate, collaborate, or influence others while protecting their image and reputation. Political skill will only develop over time if a manager has the motivation or desire to manage impressions in efforts to be received favorably, and have the aspiration to engage in political forums. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, should grow with experience regardless of a manager's stylistic preferences for managing.

Until a comparison of the TKIM's and the PSI's criterion-related validity was conducted, we didn't believe there were grounds for making hypotheses regarding which inventory would be the better predictor of performance. It should be noted however, finding comparable predictive power between the two measures would provide strong support for the predictive efficiency of the PSI, containing only 18 items as opposed to the TKIM's 90; not to mention the ease in scoring the PSI in comparison to the complex scoring methodology for the TKIM that is common among situational judgment tests. In any case, given the similarities between the two construct domains, we believe that PSI and TKIM total scores will be positively correlated.

Hypothesis 1: PSI total scores will correlate positively and significantly with TKIM total scores.

Political Skill & Charisma

Charisma was first introduced as an important contributor to leader success and organizational performance over 80 years ago with Weber's (1925) development of the three dimensional typology of ideal authority structures. According to Weber, charismatic authority utilizes a leader's creativity, character, consideration, and *extraordinary qualities* in efforts to make organizational changes, motivate workers, and achieve organizational goals. Organizational behaviorists and industrial psychologists finally adopted the construct of charisma in the 1970's and 80's by introducing and examining several leadership theories focusing on charisma as a core antecedent to leadership success (e.g. Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; House, 1977; Roberts, 1985).

There has been disagreement regarding the definition of charismatic and transformational leadership across these theories. However, they all refer to good leaders as demonstrating elements of individualized consideration, vision articulation, intellectual stimulation, behavioral flexibility, and a capacity to challenge the status quo in search of improved methods of operation or decision making (Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). Because the current study is concerned with the initial development of a measure of employee charisma, we adopt a broad definition of charisma consistent with Burns' (1978) conceptualization of transformational leadership. We define the charismatic employee as an individual who engages with coworkers or subordinates in such a way that all stakeholders involved achieve a higher level of motivation and commitment through mutual support in efforts to reach a common goal. We stipulate that the positive

outcomes of charisma transcend through the articulation of a collective vision, flexibility in decision making, inspirational communication, behavioral role-modeling, and commitment to the proposed mission.

Despite criticism over inconsistencies in the conceptualizations of charismatic and transformational leadership theories (e.g. Yukl, 1989), charisma has been consistently predictive of leader effectiveness across multiple criteria (e.g. performance ratings, subordinate satisfaction with the leader, & subordinate motivation). These findings have proven to be stable across alternative measures of charismatic and transformational leadership (Shamir & House, 1993; Bass & Avolio, 1993). Charisma, a dimension of the five-factor model of transformational leadership, has been shown to account for the majority of the variance in studies assessing the measurement of transformational leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1993). Lowe, Kroeck, and Sivasubramaniam (1996) reported a corrected mean correlation of .71 between the Multi-factor Leadership Questionnaire subscale of charisma and ratings of leader effectiveness in a meta-analysis of 47 studies examining the relationship between transformational leadership and positive organizational outcomes.

Although a vast amount of research promotes the positive effects of transformational attributes, like political skill, charisma can be detrimental to organizational outcomes if used in a manipulative fashion for individual gains. Conger (1997: 215) warns of the *darkside* of leadership, suggesting that when a visionary leader's "behaviors become exaggerated, lose touch with reality, or become vehicles for purely personal gain, they may harm the leader and the organization." He argues that

successful and genuine leaders align their strategic visions with environmental resources and stakeholder needs, avoid fundamental attribution errors, and communicate with constituents openly and honestly. Consistent with this stream of logic, Yorges, Strikland, and Weiss (1999) found that leaders were more influential when making personal sacrifices in efforts to secure their visions. This effect was augmented when followers perceived the leader as being charismatic and sharing collective interests. While self-sacrifice and personal accountability has been recognized as an important antecedent for the successful display of charisma (Conger & Kanungo, 1987), only recently have these concepts been included in measures of charisma or transformational leadership (Conger & Kanungo, 1994; Strange & Mumford, 2002). In the current study, we've included several items evaluating self-sacrifice and accountability in the initial item pool of our employee charisma scale. It will be interesting to see if these items differentiate from those items on the PSI assessing apparent sincerity. It's reasonable to assume that those individuals who are perceived as being genuine and sincere would also be perceived as being accountable for their actions.

Ferris, Davidson, and Perrewe's recent book on political skill (2005) addresses the theoretical link between charisma and the successful display of political skill. These authors frame charisma as the stylistic mechanism through which employees or managers convey political behavior. Rather than treating charisma and political skill as separate entities, they argue that political skill explains charisma in that "politically skilled leaders are effective because they astutely read contexts, situationally adjust, adapt, and calibrate their behavior to create the desired image, leverage their social capital to further reinforce

their image, and do all this in a sincere, authentic and convincing way” (pp. 167). Similar propositions linking charisma to social effectiveness have been made by Ashkanasy and Tse in their work on transformational leadership and emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence refers to the ability to recognize, access, generate, regulate, and understand emotions in social contexts to promote intellectual and emotional growth (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Under the premise that transformational leaders are successful in their display of charisma, Ashkanasy and Tse propose that transformational leaders will be better equipped to engage followers emotionally, use emotional language and communication, effectively communicate their vision, understand and sympathize with followers’ needs, maintain closer relationships with followers, appropriately use impression management techniques, and achieve higher levels of performance, follower satisfaction, and affective follower commitment.

Although Ferris et al. (2005) argue that charisma is embedded in political skill, to our knowledge, there has not been an empirical investigation testing the covariance between charisma and the PSI dimensions. The first study proposed will reexamine the factor structure of the PSI and explore whether or not charisma provides a unique dimension that could be considered a fifth facet of political skill. Though we believe that charisma will be correlated with each of the PSI dimensions, we also feel that the item content of the proposed charisma scale is supplemental to the behaviors assessed by the PSI.

Hypothesis 2(a): Charisma will demonstrate a significant positive correlation with each of the four PSI dimensions.

Hypothesis 2(b): Charisma will be identified as a unique factor of political skill when factor analyzed with the four existing PSI dimensions.

As mentioned above, an argument could be made for the overlap of the PSI's assessment of apparent sincerity and our conceptualization of charisma. In particular, elements of charisma that demonstrate a willingness to make self-sacrifices for goal attainment or an affinity for taking responsibility for work outcomes should be linked to perceptions of genuineness. It is difficult to imagine an employee willing to forfeit personal gains for a collective vision while appearing to be insincere in his or her actions. Though this proposal does not hypothesize a causal relationship between charisma and apparent sincerity, we feel that a reluctance to make self-sacrifices or take accountability for work outcomes would likely influence perceptions of an employee's genuineness. Likewise, it is reasonable to assume that perceptions of sincerity will be partly based on how well an employee can instill a vision and stimulate coworkers in an intellectual manner. It reasons that a charismatic manager sincerely communicates conviction, investment, and a desire for coworkers to share in the mutual gains of doing *good* work and achieving success. Accordingly, of the four PSI dimensions, we believed that charisma would be most strongly related to apparent sincerity.

Hypothesis 2(c): Charisma will have a stronger positive correlation with apparent sincerity than with any of the other PSI dimensions.

Researchers have established a positive link between political skill total scores and measures of self-monitoring ($r = .33$) and political savvy ($r = .47$) (Ferris et al., 2005). We included these two measures in the current research in an effort to assess their

convergence with charisma. Charismatic leaders have been acknowledged by some authors as more likely to utilize impression management techniques and more capable of identifying the environmental and emotional cues necessary for the successful execution of political behaviors or behaviors aimed at influencing or motivating others (Ashkanasy & Tse, 2000). Although self-monitoring measures an individual's ability to manage impressions (Snyder, 1987), the political savvy factor of socialization (Chao et al., 1994) assesses an employee's ability to identify the *key players* and political norms (i.e. environmental and social cues) within an organization. Consistent with the propositions of Ashkanasy and Tse, we believe that employees with higher levels of charisma will also demonstrate higher levels of self-monitoring and political savvy.

Hypothesis 3: Charisma will correlate significantly and positively with self-monitoring and political savvy.

Political Skill, Charisma, & OCB

Since Organ (1988) introduced the construct to the I/O literature nearly 20 years ago, Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) has become widely acknowledged as an important topic of study in areas of selection, performance appraisal, and employee development. OCB, otherwise known as contextual or citizenship performance, is defined as behaviors that shape “the organizational, social, and psychological context that serve as a catalyst for task activities and processes” (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993: 71). A wealth of factor analysis research has congealed the factor structure of OCB as a parsimonious, three-factor construct assessing employee personal support of coworkers, support for organizational norms and goals, and an employee's display of conscientious

initiative (Coleman & Borman, 2000) (See Table 1 for a complete taxonomy of the three-factor model of OCB). Not without debate, OCB researchers have agreed that contextual performance can be considered in-role work behaviors that contribute to the successful functioning of an organization, and that their display may be recognized by organizational reward systems (Borman & Motowidlo, 1997; Organ, 1997; Organ & Paine, 1999).

The positive influence of OCB on unit level performance and supervisor ratings of employee performance has been well established and replicated across multiple studies using diverse samples and alternative criteria (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Ahearne, 1996; Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 1994; Walz & Niehoff, 1996). In fact, Motowidlo and Van Scotter (1994) found OCB to be just as important in predicting overall performance ratings as employee task performance in a sample of 300 entry-level Air Force employees. Similar findings have been reported from several other studies, each supporting the argument that OCB and task performance are commensurate in predicting an employee's overall performance evaluation (Borman, White, & Dorsey, 1995; MacKenzie, Podsakoff & Fetter, 1991; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996).

Although it is evident that there is a link between OCB and both subjective and objective evaluations of performance, research has also provided support for the effects of OCB on the distribution of organizational rewards. Van Scotter, Motowidlo, and Cross (2000) found that citizenship performance was related to promotability ratings and the attainment of informal systemic rewards for two large military samples. Allen and

Rush (1998) found similar results linking OCB to recommendations for salary increase, promotion, high profile projects, public recognition, and opportunities for professional development. In light of these findings, OCB has been shown to influence more than just organizational effectiveness; it also facilitates employees in the acquisition of organizational rewards and in efforts toward advancing one's career.

Table 1

Coleman and Borman's (2000) Taxonomy of Citizenship Performance (i.e. OCB)

Personal Support

Helping others by offering suggestions, teaching them useful knowledge or skills, directly performing some of their tasks, and providing emotional support for their personal problems. Cooperating with others by accepting suggestions, informing them of events they should know about, and putting team objectives ahead of personal interests. Showing consideration, courtesy, and tact in relations with others as well as motivating and showing confidence in them.

Subdimensions: Helping
 Cooperating
 Courtesy

Organizational Support

Representing the organization favorably by defending and promoting it, as well as expressing satisfaction and showing loyalty by staying with the organization despite temporary hardships. Supporting the organization's mission and objectives, complying with organizational rules and procedures, and suggesting improvements.

Subdimensions: Representing
 Loyalty
 Compliance

Conscientious Initiative

Persisting with extra effort despite difficult conditions. Taking the initiative to do all that is necessary to accomplish objectives even if not normally a part of own duties, and finding additional productive work to perform when own duties are completed. Developing own knowledge and skills by taking advantage of opportunities within the organization and outside the organization using own time and resources.

Subdimensions: Persistence
 Initiative
 Self-Development

Given the important role OCB has in predicting an employee's overall performance or career success, it falls in line that any thorough investigation of a measure's criterion-related validity should include an assessment of its relationship with OCB. Validity research for the PSI has yet to formally investigate the correlation between the political skill and the OCB construct domain. In fact, only one study testing the predictive power of the PSI has utilized a comprehensive, 28 category assessment of job performance (Ferris et al., 2005). Regrettably, these researchers did not report dimensional level analyses inspecting the relationships among the many facets of job performance and political skill. The PSI validity research is also lacking a full 360 degree assessment of the scale's convergence across self, peer, and supervisor reports. Semadar, Robins, and Ferris (2006) have provided initial evidence of the convergence between PSI self and supervisory reports ($r = .36$) and the superior ability of PSI self reports to predict job performance ($r = .34$) over supervisor reports ($r = .26$). However, a study examining the predictive power of the PSI has yet to include peer reports or perform analyses looking at the correlations between political skill and the different dimensions of job performance. The second study of this proposal examined the relationships among self, peer, and supervisor reports of political skill, OCB, task performance, overall performance, and charisma.

As noted earlier, there has been a popular shift in contemporary work environments away from classic top-down organizational structures plagued by interdepartmental barriers, inefficiencies in decision making, and a mechanistic inability to effectively manage cross-functional work units. In response to an increasingly

dynamic business environment, many organizations have adopted *organic* structures characterized by interdependent departments, broadly defined jobs, flexibility in work tasks and responsibilities, subjective reward systems, a constant challenging of the status-quo, and a focus on interpersonal relationships among coworkers (Daft, 2004). Due to their reliance on social interactions, organic organizations demand the careful expression of OCB from their workers. To be successful, employees need to show support for their peers, share in organizational pride and camaraderie, and enthusiastically manage ambiguous work projects.

Ferris, Davidson, & Perrewé (2005) address the connection between political skill and contextual performance. They argue that the interpersonal nature of OCB requires employees to be socially astute, flexible, and adaptable. In other words, they postulate that politically skilled employees are more likely to display OCB than workers who are inept in social or political relations. Consistent with this reasoning, we believe that political skill will not only predict task or overall performance as it has in the past (e.g. Semadar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006), but it will also predict multi-source reports of OCB. Furthermore, because the dimension of personal support represents several politically driven behaviors such as interpersonal consideration, cooperation, and collaboration, we proposed that political skill would be most effective in predicting this dimension of OCB.

Hypothesis 4: PSI total scores will correlate significantly and positively with self, coworker, and supervisory ratings of OCB, task performance, and overall job performance.

Borman & Motowidlo (1993) argue that differences in the conceptualizations of task performance and OCB constitute the need to consider performance antecedents in reference to what *type* of performance is being examined. Although GMA has been identified as be the best predictor of overall job performance (e.g. Hunter & Hunter, 1984), Borman and Motowidlo contend that an individual's disposition or social effectiveness should predict OCB better than GMA. Their claims have been supported through numerous research efforts demonstrating positive relationships between OCB and personality measures including conscientiousness, agreeableness, positive affectivity, locus of control, and prosocial personality (Borman, Penner, Allen, & Motowidlo, 2001; Organ & Ryan, 1995). Political skill, like OCB, has a dispositional component and has been shown to correlate significantly with conscientiousness ($r = .31$) (Ferris et al., 2005). Due to the construct's social and dispositional nature, we expected political skill to do a better job of predicting OCB than task performance.

Hypothesis 5: The positive correlation between PSI total scores and coworker/supervisor OCB ratings will be stronger than the correlation between PSI total scores and coworker/supervisor task performance ratings.

The transformational and charismatic leadership literature has yet to empirically test the link between employee charisma and OCB. However, there has been a wealth of research reporting positive outcomes for leaders exhibiting high charisma such as increased leadership effectiveness ratings and reports of increased subordinate satisfaction (e.g. Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). We theorize that charismatic behaviors will also be positively correlated with the expression of OCB.

Employees who wish to articulate a vision, inspire excellence, and gain the commitment of fellow coworkers need to show support for those they wish to influence, promote ideas globally through organization-wide channels, and model performance ideals by going beyond general expectations, always being dependable, and maintaining a constant focus on self-development. Consistent with our belief that charisma is at least partially exclusive from the current PSI dimensions, we felt that the addition of charisma to the measurement of political skill will improve the PSI's ability to predict OCB. Although we did not make a hypothesis regarding charisma's ability to account for additional variance in task or overall performance ratings beyond political skill, exploratory analyses were performed to test the unique contribution of charisma to the prediction of both task and overall performance.

Hypothesis 6: Charisma will demonstrate significant positive prediction of self, coworker, and supervisor reports of OCB ratings after controlling for the other PSI dimensions.

Method

Study 1

Sample and Procedure

A total of 1,445 undergraduate psychology students at a large southeastern university completed online surveys. All participants who completed surveys were compensated with course credit. Complete data were obtained for 1,094 participants. The average age of the respondents in this sample was 20.63 (SD = 3.82), 74% were female, and 64% were part-time workers. 45% of the participants were in their junior or senior year of college. The 1094 participants were randomly split into two samples of 547 participants each. In an effort to preserve the statistical assumptions of factor analysis, the first sample was used for exploratory analyses, the second for confirmatory analyses.

Measures

Political skill. Ferris et al.'s (2005) Political Skill Inventory (PSI) was used to assess political skill and its dimensions. Specifically, the scale contains four dimensions including social astuteness (5 items), interpersonal influence (4 items), networking ability (6 items), and apparent sincerity (3 items). Respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement about themselves using a 7 point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). The coefficient alphas for each of the four PSI dimensions were .85 for social astuteness, .88 for interpersonal influence, .87 for

networking ability, and .87 for apparent sincerity. See Appendix A for a complete list of the PSI items.

Charisma. A total of 28 items were generated to assess the construct of employee charisma. Several of these items were modified from already existing measures of charisma (Conger & Kanungo, 1994; Strange & Mumford, 2002). Charisma reflects the ability to communicate high expectations, instill confidence, inspire others to reach high goals, communicate a sense of mission, and convey a powerful presence (Kudisch et al., 1995). Using the same rating format as the PSI, respondents indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement about themselves using a 7 point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). The coefficient alpha for the original charisma scale was .96. A copy of the 28 items generated to assess charisma is included in Appendix B.

Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). OCB was measured using Motowidlo and Van Scotter's (1994) 16-item scale (See Appendix C). The scale contains three dimensions including conscientious initiative (6 items), personal support (5 items), and organizational support (5 items). Scale instructions were modified to solicit self-reports of OCB rather than supervisor ratings of subordinate performance. To maintain consistency across study measures, individuals indicated the extent to which they agree with each statement using a 7 point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). The coefficient alpha for OCB was .94.

Self-monitoring. Self-monitoring was measured using Snyder's (1987) 18-item scale. Self-monitoring refers to the extent to which individuals monitor and control how

they present themselves in social situations. The coefficient alpha for the scale was .59.

A copy of the measure can be found in Appendix D.

Political savvy. Political savvy was measured using Chao et al.'s (1994) six-item instrument (See Appendix E). This scale assesses an individual's understanding of the existence and workings of politics within an organization. The coefficient alpha for political savvy was .76.

Social desirability. The Strahan and Gerbasi (1972) 10-item measure was used to assess social desirability. Social desirability refers to extent to which individuals desire to be perceived positively by those with whom they interact. The coefficient alpha for the scale was .55. See Appendix F for a complete list of the social desirability items.

Results

Item analyses. Because our interest was to further develop the PSI to include an additional dimension of charisma, we wanted only the most representative and parsimonious set of items assessing charisma to be included in the final scale.

Accordingly, a three-step item reduction procedure was utilized. Consistent with the methodology employed by Ferris et al. (2005), charisma items were first eliminated if they failed to express sufficient item-total correlations. Following the recommended cutoffs of Nunnally (1978), only those items with item-to-total correlations of .40 or greater were retained for factor analysis and cross validation. This resulted in the elimination of one item (i.e. Item 1 in the appendix).

Second, charisma items were eliminated if they correlated higher than .10 with social-desirability total scores. Researchers have become increasingly critical of self-

report measures of bio-data, personality, or social skill that are vulnerable to socially desirable responses, especially when these measures are being used for employee selection (e.g. Smith, Hanges & Dickson, 2001; Snell & McDaniel, 1998; Stokes, Hogan & Snell, 1993). The goal in this study was to create items of charisma that have a low susceptibility to participant faking. Though we originally hoped to eliminate all charisma items demonstrating a significant correlation with social-desirability, the large sample utilized for this study caused correlations greater than .083 to become significant when using a two-tail test of significance ($\alpha = .05$). Accordingly, we set a cutoff of $r = .10$ as the decision rule for eliminating items based on their relationship with social-desirability. This resulted in the elimination of an additional 4 items (i.e. Items 16, 21, 26, and 28 in the appendix).

Third, a principal axis factor analysis using Varimax rotation was conducted to identify and eliminate charisma items demonstrating high cross-loadings with the already existing political skill dimensions. Accordingly, items with loadings on charisma lower than .60, and items with loadings higher than .45 on factors *other than charisma* were eliminated from confirmatory analyses and cross validation. This resulted in the elimination of 16 items (i.e. Items 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22, 23, 24, and 25 in the appendix). Ultimately, the three-step item reduction procedure yielded a set of 7 items that met the criteria for inclusion in confirmatory analyses. The seven-item charisma scale had a coefficient alpha of .89, and item-total correlations ranging from .72 to .81. T-tests were computed on charisma total scores to assess if there were significant mean differences between the ratings provided by males and females. The *t*-test results

indicated no significant mean differences. Additional *t*-tests also indicated no statistically significant mean differences among any of the study variables in regard to gender.

Exploratory factor analysis. The principal axis factor analysis that was performed as part of the charisma item-reduction procedure also served as our exploratory factor analysis in regard to the political skill and charisma. In our initial analysis, we followed the Kaiser-Guttman criterion of retaining factors by only extracting and retaining those factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Though this methodology has been criticized for over-identifying reliable factors (Zwick & Velicer, 1986), our first analysis only extracted 3 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Each of these factors had coefficient alphas ranging from .87 to .94. According to Cliff (1988), retaining only factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 is a credible approach if the factor components demonstrate strong reliability coefficients.

A total of four principal axis factor analyses were performed to eliminate charisma items. Each of the analyses yielded a three-factor solution. The final analysis included the 18-item PSI scale and a 7-item charisma scale. As shown in Table 2, factor eigenvalues ranged from 1.33 to 12.58, with 63% of the total variance explained. The pattern of factor loadings indicate that the PSI dimensions of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and networking ability collapsed to form the first factor, explaining 50.31% of the variance in the model. Factor 2, charisma, explained 7.70% of the variance. The PSI dimension of networking produced the third factor and explained an additional 5.33% of the variance.

Table 2

Exploratory Factor Analysis: Rotated Factor Loadings & Initial Eigenvalues

Items	Intended Dimension	Factor 1 (SA) + (II) + (AS)	Factor 2 Charisma	Factor 3 Networking Ability
1. I always seem to instinctively know the right thing to say or do to influence others.	Social Astuteness	.44	.21	.49
2. I have a good intuition or “savvy” about how to present myself to others.	Social Astuteness	.66	.25	.39
3. I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	Social Astuteness	.50	.32	.28
4. I pay close attention to people’s facial expressions.	Social Astuteness	.76	.28	.14
5. I understand people very well.	Social Astuteness	.70	.24	.25
6. It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people.	Interpersonal Influence	.77	.23	.28
7. I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.	Interpersonal Influence	.73	.16	.30
8. I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	Interpersonal Influence	.71	.26	.31
9. I am good at getting people to like me.	Interpersonal Influence	.70	.18	.34
10. I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.	Networking Ability	.16	.16	.77
11. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.	Networking Ability	.27	.20	.67
12. I am good at using my connections and networks to make things happen.	Networking Ability	.29	.23	.73
13. I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.	Networking Ability	.25	.39	.60
14. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.	Networking Ability	.22	.34	.63
15. I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.	Networking Ability	.52	.33	.54
16. It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.	Apparent Sincerity	.79	.20	.15
17. I try to show a genuine interest in other people.	Apparent Sincerity	.78	.27	.19

Table 2 (Continued)

Items	Intended Dimension	Factor 1 (SA) + (II) + (AS)	Factor 2 Charisma	Factor 3 Networking Ability
18. When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.	Apparent Sincerity	.80	.24	.12
19. I have vision and often bring up ideas about possibilities for the future.	Charisma	.28	.70	.25
20. I provide inspiring strategic and organizational goals.	Charisma	.29	.70	.29
21. I consistently generate new ideas for the future of the organization.	Charisma	.10	.80	.26
22. I take into account the needs of the organization when making my work decisions.	Charisma	.44	.62	.21
23. I try to positively reward or reinforce coworkers for performing in line with my goals.	Charisma	.37	.66	.19
24. I delegate authority to my coworkers regarding work tasks in line with my goals/vision.	Charisma	.14	.72	.18
25. I demonstrate to my coworkers how committed I am to my ideas.	Charisma	.45	.66	.23
Initial Eigenvalue		12.17	1.92	1.33
Percentage of Variance Explained		50.31	7.69	5.33
Coefficient Alpha		.94	.90	.87

Note. N = 547; SA = Social Astuteness; II = Interpersonal Influence; AS = Apparent Sincerity
 Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factor Analysis
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization

Confirmatory fit statistics and alternative models. The 25 items used in the final exploratory analysis (18 PSI items; 7 Charisma items) were included in a confirmatory factor analysis using the principal axis method and oblique, direct oblimin factor rotation. We first tested the fit of the three-factor representation of political skill and charisma that was extracted during our exploratory analyses. Upon the recommendation of Hair,

Anderson, and Tatham (1997) oblique factor rotation was used as an alternative to orthogonal rotation because of the fewer constraints it imposes early in scale development. We used structural equation modeling software (Lisrel 8; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993) to perform the 3 factor confirmatory analysis. The same software was used to test the plausibility of a five-factor model treating the four PSI dimensions and charisma as separate factors. All analyses were performed using covariance matrices extracted from SPSS data worksheets (SPSS 11.5, 2003).

Several recommended measures of model fit were used including the Normed Fit Index (NFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI), the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), the standardized root mean squared residual (SRMR), and the ratio of chi-square relative to the degrees of freedom (χ^2/df) (Hu & Bentler, 1999; La Du & Tanaka, 1989; Tucker & Lewis, 1973; Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977).

It is suggested that the CFI, NFI, NNFI, and GFI should be higher than .90 for the tested model to have demonstrated acceptable fit (Hatcher, 1994; Medsker, Williams, & Holohan, 1994; Mulaik, James, Van Alstine, Bennet, Lind, & Stillwell, 1989). It is also recommended that an AGFI higher than .80 (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), an RMSEA lower than .06, an SRMR lower than .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999), and values less than five for the χ^2/df ratio should be obtained in order to infer acceptable levels of model fit (Wheaton et al., 1977).

The fit statistics for the three-factor and the hypothesized five-factor model are provided in Table 3. The three-factor solution demonstrated reasonable fit by meeting the recommended fit cutoffs for 6 of the 8 fit indices. Only the GFI (.84) and the RMSEA (.08) values failed to meet the recommended criteria; however, the values for both of these indices approached the desired cutoffs. Based on these findings, we believe the three-factor model achieves reasonable fit and should be considered a plausible representation of the political skill and charisma construct domain. Since charisma was identified and confirmed as the second factor in the model, we supported hypothesis 2(b), which made the prediction that charisma would be extracted as an additional or unique factor in the model beyond the four PSI dimensions.

When testing the 5 factor model as an alternative to the 3 factor model, we found remarkably similar results in regard to fit statistics (See Table 3). The 5 factor model also met the recommended cutoffs for 6 of the 8 fit indices, again, only falling short in regard to RMSEA and the GFI. Based on these findings, the 5 factor model should also be considered as a reasonable representation of the political skill/charisma construct domain. Differences in fit statistics between the two competing models were marginal. The 5 factor model did demonstrate a modestly favorable ratio of Chi-Square to degrees of freedom, while the 3 factor model had slightly superior GFI and AGFI indices. These modest differences in fit statistics make it difficult to select one model as *better fitting* over the other. Nonetheless, the 3-factor provides a less restrictive representation of the data and was also extracted as the predicted model during exploratory analyses. Until additional research allows for a firm judgment of model superiority, we tend to favor the

less restrictive representation of the construct. Based the present study's results, however, both models should be given credence as possible conceptualizations of the political skill and charisma construct domain.

Table 3

Model Fit Statistics for 3 and 5 Factor Models of Political Skill & Charisma

Fit Indices	3-Factor Model	5-Factor Model
Comparative Fit Index (CFI)	.97	.98
Normed Fit Index (NFI)	.97	.96
Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) (or Tucker-Lewis Index)	.97	.97
Goodness of Fit Index (GFI)	.84	.82
Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)	.81	.79
Root Mean Square Error of the Approximation (RMSEA)	.08	.08
Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual (SRMR)	.06	.06
Ratio of Chi-Square to Degrees of Freedom (χ^2/df)	4.27	2.41

Measure reliabilities and correlations. Internal consistency was estimated for all study variables using Chronbach's reliability estimate. With the exception of self-monitoring ($\alpha = .57$) and social desirability ($\alpha = .54$), all reliability estimates exceeded the .70 level recommended by Nunnally (1978) with coefficient alphas ranging from .76 for political savvy to .95 for PSI total scores. Pearson product-moment correlations between all study variables were computed and are presented in Table 4. The four PSI dimensions demonstrated strong convergence with each other as evidenced by inter-correlations ranging from .57 ($\alpha < .001$) to .81 ($\alpha < .001$). Similarly, as predicted by hypothesis 2(a), charisma also demonstrated a positive and significant correlation with each of the four PSI dimensions ranging from .56 ($\alpha < .001$) with apparent sincerity to .70

with networking ability. According to its operational definition, charisma involves gaining the commitment of others to a proposed *vision*. Since gaining the support of others relies heavily on the establishment of trust and others' belief in the purpose of the vision, charisma was hypothesized to be more strongly related to apparent sincerity than the other three PSI dimensions (See Hypothesis 2c). However, we did not find support for this prediction. Nonetheless, the pattern of positive correlations between charisma and all of the PSI dimensions indicate a rather strong convergence between the constructs of political skill and charisma. It should be noted, however, the convergence of the PSI dimensions with PSI total scores (r 's = .84 to .91, $\alpha < .001$) was more pronounced than the convergence of charisma with PSI total scores ($r = .72$, $\alpha < .001$). Although there does seem to be overlap between the four factor measure of political skill and our new measure of charisma, tests of discriminant validity need to be evaluated before a conclusion can be made regarding construct redundancy.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that charisma would be positively correlated with both political savvy and self-monitoring. We found partial support for this prediction. Although charisma correlated significantly with political savvy ($r = .58$, $\alpha < .001$), no relationship was found between charisma and self-monitoring ($r = -.03$, $\alpha = .317$). PSI total scores correlated positively and significantly with both political savvy ($r = .74$, $\alpha < .001$) and self-monitoring ($r = .06$, $\alpha < .05$). However, given the magnitude of the correlation between the PSI and self-monitoring, the relationship between the two variables could be considered marginal at best. As expected, we found initial support for our prediction (Hypothesis 4) that PSI total scores would be positively correlated with

self-reports of OCB ($r = .46, \alpha < .001$). Similarly, each of the four PSI dimensions as well as charisma were found to be significantly and positively related to self-reported OCB, with correlations ranging from $.39 (\alpha < .001)$ for networking ability to $.49 (\alpha < .001)$ for charisma.

Table 4

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Measures

Measures	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>
1. Political Skill Total	5.27	1.01	(.95)									
2. Social Astuteness	5.28	1.07	.91	(.85)								
3. Interpersonal Influence	5.54	1.21	.92	.81	(.88)							
4. Networking Ability	4.83	1.13	.86	.67	.68	(.87)						
5. Apparent Sincerity	5.75	1.24	.84	.74	.79	.57	(.87)					
6. Charisma	4.88	1.06	.72	.63	.59	.70	.56	(.89)				
7. Political Savvy	5.04	.98	.74	.70	.64	.62	.64	.58	(.76)			
8. Self Monitoring	1.55	.17	.06*	.11**	.06	.04	.00	-.03	.05	(.57)		
9. Social Desirability	1.48	.20	.04	.02	.05	.04	.06	.09*	.05	-.28	(.54)	
10. OCB	5.53	.95	.46	.40	.40	.39	.44	.49	.38	-.05	.18	(.94)

Note. Due to missing values, sample sizes range from 1,072 to 1,093. The values in parentheses represent the coefficient alphas for each of the measures.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; $p < .001$ for all correlations in bold

Regression analyses. To test our hypothesis that charisma would add to the prediction of self-reported OCB after controlling for the four PSI dimensions (See Hypothesis 6), we performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses. Specifically, we regressed OCB total scores on PSI total scores, the four PSI dimensions, and charisma in 5 separate, two-step regression analyses. In the first step of each analysis, either PSI total scores or a single PSI dimension was entered into the regression equation; charisma was then entered in the second step of the analysis. Following the procedures of Pedhazur (1997), F ratios were computed to test for significant increases in R^2 between the two regression models. Before conducting dimensional analyses, we first performed a preliminary outlier analysis regressing self-reported OCB onto PSI total scores and charisma. Researchers have recommended treating data cases with studentized deleted residuals higher than 2 standard deviations as statistical outliers (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). Taking a conservative approach to eliminating cases, we only removed those cases with studentized deleted residuals greater than 2.5 standard deviations. Accordingly, we identified and removed 18 outliers (1.6% of total sample) from Study 1 regression analyses.

As shown in Table 5, charisma predicted a significant portion of unique variance in self-reported OCB after controlling for individual PSI dimensions and PSI total scores. More specifically, charisma explained an additional 6% of the variance in OCB self-reports beyond PSI total scores and an additional 10 to 11% of the variance when entered after individual PSI dimensions. These findings provide initial support for our hypothesis

that charisma would significantly add to the prediction of self-reported OCB beyond the four-factor model of political skill.

Table 5

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) from Charisma after Controlling for Political Skill

Step	Predictors	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
Dependent Variable: Self-reports of OCB (N = 1,058)						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.487	.514	379.38	.264*	-
2	Charisma	.285	.324	84.96	.319*	.055*
1	Apparent Sincerity	.366	.473	305.04	.224*	-
2	Charisma	.335	.381	165.48	.329*	.105*
1	Interpersonal Influence	.361	.454	274.62	.206*	-
2	Charisma	.346	.394	164.52	.313*	.107*
1	Social Astuteness	.404	.456	277.20	.208*	-
2	Charisma	.345	.392	149.43	.306*	.098*
1	Networking Ability	.345	.420	225.99	.176*	-
2	Charisma	.388	.442	157.88	.284*	.107*

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to second step of the hierarchical regression.

* $p < .001$

Although we did not make a hypothesis regarding the predictive efficiency of the PSI or our newly developed charisma scale, we did perform a second series of regression analyses in order to compare each measure's ability to predict unique variance in self-reported OCB. In this second set of exploratory analyses, we entered charisma into the regression equation in the first step of the analyses and PSI total scores and dimensions in

the second step. As shown in Table 6, PSI total scores only explained an additional 4% of the variance in OCB self-reports after we controlled for charisma. Similarly, increases in R^2 ranged between .008 (networking ability) and .054 (apparent sincerity) when each of the four PSI dimensions were entered into the regression analyses after controlling for charisma. These findings, when compared against the results of the first set of regression analyses, indicate that charisma consistently explains more unique variance in self-reported OCB than PSI total scores or individual PSI dimensions. This is a particularly impressive finding when considering that charisma was measured with only 7 items while the PSI contains 18 items. In other words, charisma did a better job of predicting self-reported OCB even though the scale is less than half the length of the PSI.

Table 6

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB) from Political Skill after Controlling for Charisma

Step	Predictors	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
Dependent Variable: Self-reports of OCB (N = 1,058)						
1	Charisma	.461	.525	401.11	.275*	-
2	Political Skill Total Score	.275	.290	67.95	.319*	.044*
2	Apparent Sincerity	.211	.273	85.01	.329*	.054*
2	Interpersonal Influence	.187	.235	58.65	.312*	.038*
2	Social Astuteness	.195	.220	47.00	.306*	.031*
2	Networking Ability	.101	.123	12.11	.284*	.008*

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to second step of the hierarchical regression.

* $p < .001$

*Study 2**Sample*

Data were collected as part of a workplace study for a large southeastern county government spanning 23 agencies and over 11,000 employees. A total of 495 respondents participated in the study. The respondents consisted of 193 upper-level managers (supervisors), 169 subordinates (target workers), and 133 employees that worked closely with the target workers (coworkers). Of the upper-level managers providing demographic data, 61% were male ($N = 116$), 75% were white ($N = 143$), 12% were black ($N = 23$), and 10% were of Hispanic decent ($N = 19$). The average organizational tenure for the supervisor sample was 17.16 years ($SD = 8.49$) and the mean tenure for their current position was 11.71 ($SD = 6.15$). On average, these respondents supervised target workers for 5.18 years ($SD = 3.97$).

Target workers spanned 20 functional areas of the county government with the strongest representation in areas including administration (13%), accounting and finance (11%), environmental protection (10%), engineering (9%), social services (9%), management (8%), and technological services (5%). Of the target workers providing demographic data, 46% were male ($N = 76$), 68% were white ($N = 112$), 18% were black ($N = 30$), and 7% were of Hispanic decent ($N = 12$). The average organizational tenure for the target workers was 14.54 years ($SD = 8.70$) and their mean job tenure was 8.79 years ($SD = 5.36$). 66% of the target workers had direct supervision (i.e. managerial duties) of one or more employees ($N = 111$). The median salary for target workers was between \$45,000 and \$49,999 and 54% of the sample had a Bachelor's degree or higher.

With regard to coworkers, 47% were male ($N = 61$), 72% were white ($N = 93$), 16% were black ($N = 21$), and 9% were of Hispanic decent ($N = 12$). The average organizational tenure for coworkers was 13.98 years ($SD = 9.33$) and their mean job tenure was 8.42 years ($SD = 6.33$). On average, coworkers had worked with the target ratee for 6.65 years ($SD = 4.53$). All coworker participants included in the study had worked with the target worker a minimum of six months.

Procedure

Cover letters and instruction sheets explaining the purpose of the study were sent via interoffice mail to 600 upper-level managers/supervisors working in their current job for a minimum of one year. Supervisors were responsible for selecting the target worker (subordinate) and coworker participating in the study. They were instructed to choose a subordinate that reported directly to them and for whom they provided formal organizational performance evaluations. All subordinates chosen for the study had to meet the criteria of being in a managerial position or earning a minimum salary of \$35,000. Supervisors were asked to distribute a *target worker* instruction sheet to the subordinate of they chose to participate in the study. They were also instructed to distribute a *coworker* instruction sheet to an employee that worked closely with their subordinate. Supervisor, target, and coworker instruction sheets explained the purpose of the study and directed participants to a web address hosting three separate links for online surveys. Participants accessed the online surveys by following the appropriate survey link and entering a participation code provided on their instruction sheet.

Participants were informed that the purpose for completing surveys was to identify important training objectives and to develop future training courses geared toward managerial development. They were asked to be candid in their responses and were assured of their anonymity. Complete data were collected from 193 supervisors (response rate of 32%), 169 target workers (response rate of 28%), and 133 coworkers (response rate of 22%). In all, complete data were collected for 100 full participant triads.

Measures

Political skill. Political skill was measured using the Ferris et al.'s (2005) 18 item PSI that was used in Study 1. Using a seven-point Likert response format, participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item (1 = Strongly Agree, 7 = Strongly Disagree). All items were modified from the first person to the third person to elicit appropriate responses from target workers, supervisors, and coworkers. The same response format was employed to assess all study variables with the exception of tacit knowledge. The coefficient alphas for each of the PSI's four dimensions ranged from .77 (social astuteness, target reports) to .93 (interpersonal influence, coworker reports) across target worker, supervisor, and coworker reports. The coefficient alphas for PSI total scores ranged from .92 for target reports to .96 for coworker reports.

Charisma. Charisma was measured using the seven charisma items from Study 1 that were retained for factor analyses. The coefficient alphas for charisma were .85 for target workers, .89 for supervisors, and .91 for coworkers.

OCB. OCB was measured using five items from Borman, Ackerman, & Kubisiak's (1994) behaviorally-anchored rating scale (BARS) of job performance (See Appendix G). Target, supervisor, and coworker ratings of initiative, adaptability, dependability, cooperation, and integrity were combined to create an OCB total score. Study results are reported at both the OCB composite level and at the dimensional level. The coefficient alphas for OCB total scores were .68 for target workers, .81 for supervisors, and .85 for coworkers.

Task & overall performance. Task performance was measured using 6 items from Borman et al.'s (1994) job performance BARS (See Appendix G). Target, supervisor, and coworker ratings of job knowledge, task proficiency, productivity, problem solving, and oral/written communication were combined to create a task performance total score. Ratings of overall performance were obtained using a single item administered after all other performance dimensions had been rated. Study results are reported at both the task performance composite level and at the dimensional level. The coefficient alphas for task performance total scores were .68 for target workers, .79 for supervisors, and .77 for coworkers.

Tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge was measured using five of the nine situational stems from Wagner and Sternberg's (1991) Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM). The TKIM is a 90-item situational judgment test (SJT) asking respondents to rate the appropriateness of action-items relating to nine separate situational vignettes using a 7-point Likert scale. The TKIM was developed to assess the experience-based knowledge or practical intelligence of civilian managers. In the current

study, the five TKIM scenarios (51 items) involving the use of influence tactics or interpersonal interaction were administered to target workers. Due to the length of the TKIM and limited access to participant work time, we were only able to include the situation stems having the most conceptual overlap with the other key study variables (i.e. political skill and charisma). Only target workers completed the abridged version of the measure.

TKIM total scores were computed by comparing individual target worker responses to consensus reference patterns on each item. Legree (1995) argues that using consensus reference patterns to score situational judgment tests is particularly appropriate when it is difficult to identify experts on the construct of interest. He supports his claim with research demonstrating correlations ranging from .72 to .95 between mean ratings of experts and nonexperts on a situational judgment test assessing tacit knowledge in a military sample (Legree, 1994). In the case of tacit knowledge, it would be extremely difficult to isolate *subject matter experts* with unique expertise in practical intelligence. Accordingly, using consensus reference patterns to score the TKIM would be consistent with Legree's recommendations.

In order to calculate TKIM total scores, z-score transformations were computed for all target worker responses. Z-score transformations control for response bias and do not punish participants for using response anchors that are different from the consensus reference pattern (Legree, 1995; Legree, Martin & Psotka, 2000). TKIM total scores were computed by summing across the absolute values of item z-scores for each target worker participant.

Results

Convergent and discriminant validity. Table 7 presents the correlations among self, supervisor, and coworker reports of PSI total scores, the four political skill dimensions, and charisma within a multitrait-multimethod matrix. Inspection of the validity diagonals in Table 7 indicates that self and supervisor ratings of overall political skill were significantly correlated ($r = .33, p < .01$). Likewise, the correlation between self and coworker ratings of overall political skill ($r = .28, p < .01$) as well as the correlation between coworker and supervisor ratings of political skill ($r = .32, p < .01$) were also significant. This same general pattern holds true for each of the four PSI dimensions. That is, there were significant correlations between reports of each of the four PSI dimensions regardless of the reporting source. The magnitude of these correlations ranged from .18 ($p < .05$) for the relationship between self and supervisor ratings of apparent sincerity, to .40 ($p < .01$) for the relationship between self and supervisor ratings of social astuteness. These findings provide evidence for the convergence of political skill across self, supervisor, and coworker reports. It should be noted, however, that this finding was less pronounced when comparing self-ratings to coworker ratings.

Further inspection of the validity diagonals in Table 7 indicates that self and supervisor ratings of charisma were also significantly correlated ($r = .37, p < .01$). However, the positive correlation between self and coworker ratings of charisma ($r = .13, p = .15$), and the positive correlation between coworker and supervisor ratings of charisma ($r = .13, p = .18$) did not reach significance.

TABLE 7

Multi-Trait, Multi-Method Correlation Matrix for Political Skill & Charisma

Measures	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
<i>Self Ratings, N = 169</i>																				
1. Political Skill Total	5.54	0.73	--																	
2. Social Astuteness	5.44	0.80	.86	--																
3. Interpersonal Influence	5.87	0.82	.80	.67	--															
4. Networking Ability	4.98	1.05	.87	.61	.51	--														
5. Apparent Sincerity	6.39	0.78	.66	.50	.54	.41	--													
6. Charisma	5.55	0.84	.73	.65	.51	.64	.58	--												
<i>Supervisor Ratings, N = 193</i>																				
7. Political Skill Total	5.36	0.91	.33	.35	.28	.24	.21	.28	--											
8. Social Astuteness	5.15	1.06	.37	.40	.34	.25	.23	.30	.90	--										
9. Interpersonal Influence	5.80	1.12	.29	.33	.33	.14	.23	.21	.88	.74	--									
10. Networking Ability	4.90	1.05	.23	.22	.13	.23	.09	.24	.84	.71	.55	--								
11. Apparent Sincerity	6.04	1.00	.22	.23	.16	.15	.18	.19	.76	.57	.79	.43	--							
12. Charisma	5.35	0.97	.32	.30	.22	.30	.17	.37	.79	.75	.64	.67	.61	--						
<i>Coworker Ratings, N = 133</i>																				
13. Political Skill Total	5.36	1.05	.28	.27	.27	.17	.29	.10	.32	.26	.29	.30	.24	.18	--					
14. Social Astuteness	5.17	1.10	.31	.32	.30	.19	.30	.15	.28	.27	.25	.25	.17	.17	.94	--				
15. Interpersonal Influence	5.64	1.32	.18	.18	.22	.08	.20	-.03	.32	.25	.35	.24	.29	.12	.91	.83	--			
16. Networking Ability	5.12	1.15	.29	.25	.21	.24	.28	.18	.30	.24	.18	.36	.17	.25	.86	.75	.64	--		
17. Apparent Sincerity	5.78	1.22	.20	.21	.22	.07	.28	.03	.22	.16	.29	.13	.25	.05	.87	.80	.86	.59	--	
18. Charisma	5.42	1.06	.16	.20	.16	.07	.16	.13	.17	.13	.15	.15	.17	.13	.82	.79	.71	.70	.77	--

Note. Due to missing values, sample sizes ranged from 121 to 193. Bold-underlined numbers represent monotrait-heteromethod correlations. Roman numbers represent heterotrait-heteromethod correlations. Bold-italic numbers represent heterotrait-monomethod correlations. $r \geq .18$, $p < .05$ (two-tail). $r \geq .23$, $p < .01$ (two-tail).

These findings provide evidence for the convergence of charisma between self and supervisor reports. On the other hand, these data suggest that coworker reports of charisma fail to converge with either self or supervisor ratings of the construct. Also of interest is the fact that the magnitude of the heterotrait-monomethod correlations for self-ratings of all four PSI dimensions and charisma appear to be somewhat smaller than the same correlations among coworker and supervisor ratings. This pattern of findings may indicate a stronger halo effect associated with supervisor and coworker ratings. Similar findings have been found in past research involving multi-source reports of OCB (Allen et al., 2000). Interestingly, this pattern of correlations was also observed among Study 2 criteria (OCB, task performance, & overall performance). These data are presented in Table 8.

In order to assess the divergence of the four PSI dimensions and charisma across reporting sources, we compared the mono-trait, hetero-method correlations with corresponding hetero-trait, hetero-method correlations provided in Table 7. In regard to self and supervisor reports, charisma and social astuteness demonstrated the best divergence from the other PSI dimensions. For both of these dimensions, there were no reversals between mono-trait, hetero-method correlations and hetero-trait, hetero-method correlations. In other words, the mono-trait, hetero-method correlations for both of these dimensions were higher than all eight of their corresponding hetero-trait, hetero-method correlations. Interpersonal influence showed only one reversal while networking ability and apparent sincerity each yielded three. The pattern of these correlations provides

mixed support for the divergence of these five dimensions when comparing ratings from target workers and their supervisors.

A similar pattern of correlations is found for the four PSI dimensions when comparing coworker and supervisor reports. For these two data sources, social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and networking ability yielded no reversals when comparing mono-trait, hetero-method correlations with corresponding hetero-trait, hetero-method correlations. This finding supports the divergence of these three dimensions. On the other hand, apparent sincerity demonstrated two reversals while charisma yielded a total of five, suggesting a strong overlap between these two dimensions and the other three facets of the PSI. When considering self and coworker reports, only social astuteness demonstrated zero reversals. Interpersonal influence and apparent sincerity each demonstrated one reversal, networking ability yielded two, and charisma yielded five. Taken together, there is mixed support for the divergence of the four PSI dimensions and charisma. The extent to which each of these dimensions discriminate from one another is influenced by the reporting source. In general, these five dimensions tend to be most divergent when comparing ratings from target workers and their supervisors, or when comparing ratings from supervisors and coworkers.

Criterion-related validity. Table 8 provides Pearson product-moment correlations among Study 2 predictors and criteria. Hypothesis 4 argued that self-reported PSI total scores would be positively and significantly correlated with self, coworker, and supervisor ratings of OCB, task performance, and overall job performance. With the exception of coworker ratings of OCB and task performance, we found that self-reported

political skill correlated positively and significantly with all Study 2 criteria irregardless of reporting source. These correlations appear to be higher for self-reported criteria, ranging in magnitude from .35 ($p < .01$) for overall performance to .53 ($p < .01$) for OCB, than they were for supervisor-reported criteria with correlations ranging from .19 ($p < .05$) for OCB to .25 ($p < .01$) for task performance. In regard to coworker reported criteria, political skill demonstrated a significant correlation with overall performance ($r = .20, p < .05$). These findings provided support for 7 of the 9 predictions proposed by hypothesis 4. A closer inspection of the correlations between supervisor ratings of individual performance dimensions and political skill (See Table 9) indicated that PSI scores significantly correlated with 7 of the 10 performance dimensions (r 's = .19 to .26, p 's $< .01$), with the strongest correlation being with problem solving ($r = .26, p < .01$). Taken together, these results indicate a fairly consistent linkage between political skill and performance across different reporting sources and diverse performance dimensions.

Hypothesis 5 proposed that self-reported political skill would correlate more strongly with coworker and supervisor reports of OCB than with reports of task performance from the same sources. We did not find support for this prediction. In fact, PSI total scores had higher correlations with supervisor ratings of task performance ($r = .25, p < .01$) than with supervisor ratings of OCB ($r = .19, p < .05$). Neither coworker-reported OCB ($r = .15, p = .13$) nor coworker-reported task performance ($r = .15, p = .12$) were significantly correlated with self-reported political skill.

TABLE 8

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Study 2 Measures

Measures	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
<i>Self Ratings</i>														
1. PSI Total Score	5.54	0.73	--											
2. Charisma	5.55	0.84	.73	--										
3. TKIM Total	29.07	6.80	.01	.01	--									
4. OCB	31.38	2.80	.53	.51	-.06	--								
5. Task Performance	29.51	3.25	.43	.38	-.05	.57	--							
6. Overall Performance	6.07	0.67	.35	.34	-.10	.46	.59	--						
<i>Supervisor Ratings</i>														
7. OCB	30.16	4.04	.19	.22	.16	.23	.29	.21	--					
8. Task Performance	29.31	4.03	.25	.31	.15	.13	.36	.29	.67	--				
9. Overall Performance	6.09	0.92	.23	.29	.20	.15	.33	.30	.78	.82	--			
<i>Coworker Ratings</i>														
10. OCB	29.41	4.69	.15	.06	-.07	.15	.23	.18	.45	.27	.41	--		
11. Task Performance	28.98	4.07	.15	.17	.09	.14	.26	.20	.37	.38	.50	.76	--	
12. Overall Performance	5.93	0.96	.20	.15	.05	.19	.28	.27	.34	.42	.51	.83	.81	--

Note. Due to missing values, sample sizes ranged from 108 to 168. Bold-underlined numbers represent monotrait-heteromethod correlations. Roman numbers in columns 4 thru 9 represent heterotrait-heteromethod correlations. Bold-italic numbers represent heterotrait-monomethod correlations.

$r \geq .19$, $p < .05$ (two-tail). $r \geq .25$, $p < .01$ (two-tail).

Table 9

Correlations between Study 2 Predictors and Supervisor Ratings of Performance

<i>Performance Dimension</i>	<i>PSI Total Scores</i>	<i>Charisma</i>	<i>TKIM</i>
Job Knowledge	.07	.16	-.05
Task Proficiency	.20	.24	.04
Productivity	.20	.24	.26
Problem Solving	.26	.26	.16
Communication	.19	.23	.19
Initiative	.22	.29	.16
Adaptability	.23	.22	.16
Dependability	-.03	.04	.14
Cooperation	.20	.15	.12
Integrity	.11	.14	-.01
Overall	.23	.29	.20

Note. N = 144-147. $r \geq .16$, $p < .05$. $r \geq .22$, $p < .01$.

Interestingly, self ratings of OCB demonstrated higher correlations with self ratings of political skill ($r = .53$, $p < .001$) than did self-ratings of task performance ($r = .43$, $p < .001$). However, the difference between these two correlations did not reach statistical significance ($t(143) = 1.53$, $p > .05$) when conducting a significance test for the difference between dependant correlation coefficients (e.g. Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

Charisma also demonstrated several positive correlations with Study 2 criteria across two of the three reporting sources. As shown in Table 9, charisma was positively and significantly correlated with self reports (r 's = .34 to .51) and supervisor reports (r 's = .22 to .31) of OCB, task performance, and overall performance. Similar to political skill, charisma also correlated with 7 of the 10 dimensional performance ratings provided by supervisors (r 's = .16 to .29), the highest correlation being with initiative ($r = .29$, $p < .01$). In regard to TKIM scores, the abridged SJT failed to correlate with self ratings (r 's

= -.05 to -.10) or coworker ratings (r 's = -.07 to .09) of overall performance, task performance, or OCB. Interesting, all the correlations between TKIM scores and self-reported criteria were negative, though none of these correlations was significant. TKIM scores only demonstrated a significant relationship with supervisor ratings of overall job performance ($r = .20, p < .05$) among all of the Study 2 criteria. However, when looking at individual performance dimensions, tacit knowledge did correlate positively and significantly with five of the ten performance dimensions rated by supervisors, the highest correlations being with employee productivity ($r = .26, p < .01$) and communication ($r = .19, p < .05$). Finally, contrary to our expectations (See Hypothesis 1), the TKIM did not correlate with either of the other Study 2 predictors, political skill ($r = .01, p = .93$) or charisma ($r = .01, p = .87$). This is surprising considering the conceptual overlap shared by political skill, charisma, and tacit knowledge. We address possible explanations for this null finding in the discussion.

Regression analyses. To investigate the extent to which Study 2 predictors differentially explained unique variance in multi-source performance ratings, we conducted several hierarchical regression analyses. In the first series of analyses we regressed multi-source reports of overall performance, task performance, and OCB on political skill, charisma, and TKIM scores. We initially controlled for employee organizational tenure, salary, education and age, but found that these control variables failed to predict a statistically significant proportion of the variance in any of the performance criteria regardless of reporting source (R^2 's = .013 to .061, $M = .030, p$'s $> .05$). Accordingly, we removed the control variables from each regression analysis and

only reported variance explained by each of the Study 1 predictors. Since we were interested in the extent to which charisma and tacit knowledge explained variance in performance criteria beyond the PSI, we entered PSI scores in the first step of each analysis, charisma in the second, and TKIM scores in the third and final step. Before reporting our final results, we performed preliminary outlier analyses and removed cases with studentized deleted residuals greater than ± 2 standard deviations. Accordingly, we removed between 5 and 10 cases for each regression analysis depending on the reporting source of the criteria and the performance dimensions being regressed (e.g. overall performance, task performance, or OCB).

Table 10 shows the results for the analyses treating supervisor performance reports as the dependent variable. The addition of PSI total scores to the regression analyses resulted in the explanation of a significant portion of the variance in supervisor ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .062, p < .01$), task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .068, p < .01$), and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .039, p < .05$). At the second step of the analysis, charisma significantly increased the prediction of supervisory reports of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .029, p < .05$) and task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .036, p < .05$) when being entered after PSI scores. However, charisma failed to account for additional variance in supervisor ratings of OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .021, p = .08$). Based on these findings, we found partial support for hypothesis 6. Charisma significantly contributed to the prediction of two of the three supervisor performance ratings after controlling for political skill.

The addition of TKIM scores at the third step of analyses significantly increased the prediction of supervisor ratings of overall performance by 4%. However, the TKIM

did not significantly add to the prediction of supervisory ratings of task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .000$, $p = .94$) or OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .003$, $p = .55$). As such, the TKIM was only successful in contributing to the prediction of one of the three supervisor performance ratings after controlling for political skill and charisma. Taken together, the Study 2 predictors explained a significant portion of the variance in supervisor ratings of overall performance (13%), task performance (10%) and OCB (6%).

Table 10

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Supervisor Reports of Performance from Study 2 Predictors

Step	Predictors Included	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported Overall Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.267	.249	8.83	.062*	--
2	Charisma	.230	.245	4.31	.091*	.029 ⁺
3	TKIM Total Score	.021	.187	5.26	.126*	.035 ⁺
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported Task Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	1.19	.261	9.76	.068*	--
2	Charisma	1.12	.279	5.37	.104*	.036 ⁺
3	TKIM Total Score	0.00	.007	0.01	.104*	.000
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported OCB</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.867	.198	5.53	.039 ⁺	--
2	Charisma	.816	.213	3.03	.061 ⁺	.021
3	TKIM Total Score	.026	.051	0.37	.063 ⁺	.003

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to the hierarchical regression.

⁺ $p < .05$; * $p < .01$; N = 135-136

Table 11 provides results from analyses regressing self-reported overall performance, task performance, and OCB on each of the Study 2 predictors. The

inclusion of PSI total scores at the first step of the regression analyses resulted in the explanation of a significant portion of the variance in self ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .176$, $p < .01$), task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .236$, $p < .01$), and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .291$, $p < .05$). At the second step of the analysis, charisma significantly increased the prediction of self-reports of task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .024$, $p < .05$) and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .045$, $p < .01$) when being entered after PSI scores. However, charisma failed to account for a significant portion of the variance in self ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .015$, $p = .09$). Based on these findings, we again found partial support for Hypothesis 6. Charisma significantly contributed to the prediction of two of the three self-rated performance criteria after controlling for political skill.

Table 11

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Self Reports of Performance from Study 2 Predictors

Step	Predictors Included	B	B	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported Overall Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.328	.420	32.79	.176*	--
2	Charisma	.126	.188	2.90	.192*	.015
3	TKIM Total Score	-.018	-.218	9.48	.240*	.048*
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported Task Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	1.79	.486	47.67	.236*	--
2	Charisma	0.74	.231	5.07	.261*	.024 ⁺
3	TKIM Total Score	0.04	.105	2.29	.272*	.011
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported OCB</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	1.93	.539	63.10	.291*	--
2	Charisma	0.98	.315	10.45	.336*	.045*
3	TKIM Total Score	-0.03	-.087	1.74	.343*	.007

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to the hierarchical regression.

⁺ $p < .05$; * $p < .01$; $N = 154-155$

The addition of TKIM scores at the third step of analysis significantly increased the prediction of self ratings of overall performance by 5%. Interestingly, the direction of this relationship was negative. In other words, individuals with higher TKIM scores were found to rate themselves lower on overall performance than individuals with lower TKIM scores. This is contrary to our expectations, especially because there was a significant positive relationship identified between TKIM total scores and supervisor reports of overall performance. In regard to the other two self-reported performance criteria, the TKIM did not significantly add to the prediction of self ratings of task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .011$, $p = .13$) or OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .007$, $p = .19$). As such, the TKIM was only successful in

contributing to the prediction of one of the three self-rated performance criteria after controlling for political skill and charisma, and this prediction was negative in direction. Nonetheless, when all three Study 2 predictors were included in analyses they explained a significant portion of the variance in self ratings of overall performance (24%), task performance (27%) and OCB (34%).

Table 12 provides results from analyses regressing coworker-reported overall performance, task performance, and OCB on each of the Study 2 predictors. As shown in the table, only PSI total scores predicted a significant portion of variance in any of the coworker-reported performance criteria. Specifically, political skill predicted a significant portion of the variance in coworker ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .079, p < .01$) when included in the first step of the analysis. Charisma failed to predict additional variance in any of the criteria when added at the second step. Likewise, TKIM total scores were unsuccessful in explaining variance in coworker-reported criteria when entered at the third step of each analysis. Based on these findings, we did not support our hypothesis that charisma would explain additional variance in coworker performance ratings after controlling for political skill.

Table 12

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Coworker Reports of Performance from Study 2 Predictors

Step	Predictors Included	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
<i>Dependent Variable: Coworker-reported Overall Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.322	.282	8.81	.079*	--
2	Charisma	.103	.099	0.54	.084 ⁺	.005
3	TKIM Total Score	.010	.088	0.85	.092 ⁺	.008
<i>Dependent Variable: Coworker-reported Task Performance</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.772	.157	2.56	.025	--
2	Charisma	1.013	.225	2.67	.050	.025
3	TKIM Total Score	.059	.117	1.47	.063	.014
<i>Dependent Variable: Coworker-reported OCB</i>						
1	Political Skill Total Score	.490	.096	0.95	.009	--
2	Charisma	.516	.109	0.60	.015	.006
3	TKIM Total Score	-.012	-.023	0.06	.016	.001

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to the hierarchical regression.

⁺ $p < .05$; * $p < .01$; N = 103-104

Exploratory analyses. In order to competitively assess the predictive efficiency of the four PSI dimensions and charisma we first investigated the strength of the correlations between each of the dimensions and supervisor ratings of performance (See Table 13). Consistent with the findings of Ferris et al. (2005), social astuteness demonstrated the strongest positive relationship with each of the performance ratings, with correlations ranging from .24 with OCB to .33 with overall performance. However, while social astuteness was the only PSI dimension to significantly correlate with performance in the Ferris et al. study, we found significant positive correlations for four of the five dimensions of interest. In regard to the magnitude of these correlations,

charisma was a close second to social astuteness with correlations ranging from .22 with OCB to .29 with overall performance. Apparent sincerity and interpersonal influence demonstrated modest relationships with performance as indicated by correlations ranging between .18 and .22 across performance ratings. Networking ability, on the other hand, was the only dimension that failed to correlate significantly with any of the supervisor ratings of performance (r 's = .08 - .13, p 's > .05).

Table 13

Correlations between PSI Dimensions, Charisma and Supervisor Ratings of Performance

<i>Predictors by Dimension</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Overall Performance</i>	<i>Task Performance</i>	<i>OCB</i>
Social Astuteness	5.45	0.81	.33**	.34**	.24**
Interpersonal Influence	5.89	0.82	.21*	.20*	.18*
Networking Ability	4.96	1.07	.09	.13	.08
Apparent Sincerity	6.39	0.78	.22**	.21*	.20*
Charisma	5.55	0.84	.29**	.31**	.22**

Note. N = 144-147. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Since apparent sincerity and charisma demonstrated the strongest positive trend in predicting performance criteria among the 5 dimensions of interest, we included only these two dimensions and TKIM total scores as predictors in our exploratory regression analyses. Consistent with the first round of analyses, the control variables (organizational tenure, salary, education, and age) failed to predict a significant portion of variance in any of the performance ratings. This finding was observed across all reporting sources (R^2 's = .013 to .068, $M = .031$, p 's > .05). Accordingly, these variables were removed from analyses. We also conducted preliminary outlier analyses for each of our exploratory regressions. This resulted in the identification of 6 to 10 outliers (N 's = 134

to 138) that were removed from corresponding analyses before final results were reported.

Table 14 shows the results for the exploratory analyses treating supervisor performance ratings as dependent variables in each regression equation. The addition of social astuteness in the first step of the regression analyses resulted in the explanation of a significant portion of the variance in supervisor ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .153$, $p < .01$), task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .144$, $p < .01$), and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .055$, $p < .01$).

Table 14

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Supervisor Reports of Performance from Social Astuteness, Charisma, and TKIM Scores

Step	Predictors Included	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported Overall Performance</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	.336	0.39	24.04	.153*	--
2	Charisma	.194	0.23	4.97	.184*	.031 ⁺
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	-.164	-1.85	6.31	.221*	.038 ⁺
4	TKIM Scores	.000	0.00	0.00	.221*	.000
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported Task Performance</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	1.58	0.38	22.49	.144*	--
2	Charisma	0.72	0.18	2.86	.162*	.018
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	-1.40	-3.26	21.02	.277*	.115*
4	TKIM Scores	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	.277*	.000
<i>Dependent Variable: Supervisor-reported OCB</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	.945	0.24	7.97	.055*	--
2	Charisma	.596	0.15	1.94	.069*	.013
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	-.629	-1.51	3.76	.094*	.025
4	TKIM Scores	.013	0.02	0.08	.095*	.001

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to second step of the hierarchical regression.

⁺ $p < .05$; * $p < .01$; N = 134-137

Adding charisma at the second step of the analyses resulted in a significant increase in the prediction of supervisory reports of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .031, p < .05$).

However, charisma did not enhance the prediction of task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .018, p = .09$) or OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .013, p = .17$) after controlling for social astuteness.

To examine the possible interactive effects of charisma and social astuteness, we created an interaction term for these two predictors and entered it in the third step of the regression analyses. This interaction was found to be significant for both task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .038, p < .05$) and overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .115, p < .01$). As depicted in Figures 1 and 2, social astuteness had more influence in predicting task and overall performance for employees with low charisma scores than for employees with high charisma scores. In other words, employees with low charisma were more likely to receive high task and overall performance ratings if they carefully adhered to social and contextual cues while interacting with others at work. Taken together, these findings indicate that employees with strong charisma are not as reliant on astuteness in order to make a good impression on their supervisors. Interestingly, this effect was three times as strong when predicting supervisor ratings of task performance, than when predicting supervisor ratings of overall performance. When taking a closer look at how this interaction predicted individual task performance dimensions, we found the interaction to be statistically significant for all five task performance dimensions with the strongest interaction being observed when predicting dimensions of job knowledge ($\Delta R^2 = .091, p < .01$) and communication ($\Delta R^2 = .099, p < .01$).




Figure 1. The interactive effects of charisma and social astuteness when predicting supervisor ratings of task performance.

Note.

High Charisma represents cases with charisma Z-scores greater than 1 SD
 $Y' = 3.89 + 5.27(\text{Social Astuteness}); R^2 = 0.06$

Low Charisma represents cases with charisma Z-scores less than -1 SD
 $Y' = 23.47 + 1.20(\text{Social Astuteness}); R^2 = 0.77$




Figure 2. The interactive effects of charisma and social astuteness when predicting supervisor ratings of overall performance.

Note.

High Charisma represents cases with charisma Z-scores greater than 1 SD
 $Y' = 4.54 + 0.33(\text{Social Astuteness}); R^2 = 0.07$

Low Charisma represents cases with charisma Z-scores less than -1 SD
 $Y' = 2.75 + 0.65(\text{Social Astuteness}); R^2 = 0.36$

When entered in the final step of each analysis, TKIM scores failed to account for additional variance across supervisor performance ratings. Accordingly, the unique variance explained in supervisor performance ratings demonstrated by TKIM scores in the first round of regression analyses was not replicated. Instead, the data suggest that social astuteness, charisma and their interaction are collectively exhaustive of the variance explained in supervisor reports of performance when considering these two predictors along with TKIM scores in the regression equation. In fact, when considering only social astuteness and charisma, these two predictors and their interaction accounted for a total of 22% of the variance explained in supervisor ratings of overall performance, 28% of the variance explained in task performance, and 9% of the variance explained in OCB. These findings are impressive given the fact that social astuteness and charisma are measured with only 12 items.

Table 15 shows the results for the exploratory analyses treating each self-reported performance rating as the dependent variable in each regression equation. The addition of social astuteness in the first step of the regression analyses resulted in the explanation of a significant portion of the variance in supervisor ratings of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .151, p < .01$), task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .233, p < .01$), and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .241, p < .01$). Adding charisma at the second step of the analyses resulted in a significant increase in the prediction of self-reports of overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .034, p < .05$), task performance ($\Delta R^2 = .037, p < .05$), and OCB ($\Delta R^2 = .135, p < .05$).

Table 15

Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Self-Reported Performance from Social Astuteness, Charisma, and TKIM Scores

Step	Predictors Included	B	β	ΔF	R^2	ΔR^2
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported Overall Performance</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	.278	.388	27.29	.151*	--
2	Charisma	.166	.245	6.32	.184*	.034 ⁺
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	.028	.384	0.29	.186*	.002
4	TKIM Scores	-.019	-.228	10.24	.237*	.052*
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported Task Performance</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	1.61	.482	46.65	.233*	--
2	Charisma	0.80	.250	7.67	.269*	.037*
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	0.22	.652	0.93	.274*	.004
4	TKIM Scores	-0.05	-.127	3.42	.290*	.016
<i>Dependent Variable: Self-reported OCB</i>						
1	Social Astuteness	1.51	.491	49.16	.241*	--
2	Charisma	1.38	.472	33.29	.376*	.135*
3	Soc. Astuteness x Charisma	-0.17	-.525	0.71	.379*	.003
4	TKIM Scores	-0.03	-.079	1.55	.385*	.006

Note. B indicates unstandardized beta weights; β indicates standardized beta weights; ΔF indicates results from incremental F tests; R^2 indicates the amount of variance explained in the dependent variable; ΔR^2 indicates the increase in R^2 when adding a variable to second step of the hierarchical regression.

⁺ $p < .05$; * $p < .01$; $N = 134-137$

Interestingly, the interaction between social astuteness and charisma did not explain additional variance in any of the self-reported criteria. However, entering TKIM scores in the final step of analyses did explain an additional 5% of the variance in self-reported overall performance. Still, consistent with the first round of regression analyses, this relationship was found to be negative.

In regard to coworker ratings of performance, the predictors in the exploratory analyses failed to predict a significant portion of the variance in these criteria. The only

exception was the ability of social astuteness to modestly predict coworker-reported overall performance ($\Delta R^2 = .072$, $p < .01$). In regard to the social astuteness/charisma interaction, the interaction term did not explain unique variance in coworker reports of overall performance, task performance, or OCB (ΔR^2 's = .000 - .012, p 's $> .05$). Our results indicate that the interaction between social astuteness and charisma is only observed when predicting supervisor-reports of job performance.

Discussion

Factor Structure of Political Skill

One major goal of the current research was to examine and expand upon Ferris et al.'s (2005) four-factor structure of political skill. In particular, we were interested in the stability of the original four-factor model, and the extent to which our measure of charisma provided a unique contribution to the political skill construct domain. Study 1 factor analyses identified charisma as a unique addition to the existing political skill behavioral taxonomy. On the other hand, exploratory analyses did not provide support for the differentiation of the PSI's four factors of political skill. Specifically, PSI dimensions of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and apparent sincerity converged into a single dimension, producing a three factor representation of political skill when combined with networking ability and charisma.

One possible explanation for this finding could be the result of using a student sample. Although the majority of the participants in Study 1 were part or full-time workers, an argument could be made that college students have yet to experience work scenarios requiring them to differentiate between behaviors of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and apparent sincerity. This is a reasonable contention given that these three factors of political skill, though conceptually different, share a commonality in regard to reading social cues. By definition, socially astute workers have the ability to read and understand social situations to determine the appropriate course of action in

response to a given scenario. Interpersonal influence requires the selection of effective persuasion techniques that are dependent upon the information provided by the social context in which the worker wishes to exercise influence. Similarly, the successful display of apparent sincerity is also reliant on the environment in which a message or idea is delivered. For instance, audience characteristics and/or the mode of delivery should have some impact on the content or expression of a message which is intended to be perceived as genuine or sincere.

Based on their limited exposure to diverse work scenarios requiring the use of politics or influence, undergraduate students may collapse their interpretation of social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and apparent sincerity into a single, higher-order factor broadly focused on the ability to mold behavior to fit social or environmental contexts. Professional level employees, on the other hand, may be more akin to differentiate between these three factors as a result of work experiences requiring skill in unique contexts such as assessing social/environmental cues, using discretion when choosing influence tactics, and conveying ideas genuinely through the expression of emotions such as modesty, passion, commitment, or accountability. Unfortunately, the current research was unable to test for differences in political skill conceptualizations between undergraduate students and professionals using exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses; Study 2 did not provide a sufficient professional sample to conduct such analyses. Nonetheless, taken together with the work of Ferris et al., the present findings suggest that there are inconsistencies in how individuals distinguish between political behaviors depending on their level of professional experience.

Multi-source Convergence of Political Skill

Another important goal of the present research was to test the convergence of political skill and charisma across multiple reporting sources (i.e. self-reports, coworker-reports, and supervisor-reports). By demonstrating some consistency in agreement of employee political skill across sources, we would have greater confidence that the measure was able to assess meaningful facets of social effectiveness. Although Study 2 provided mixed results for the convergence of the PSI dimensions and charisma across self, coworker, and supervisor reports, a positive trend did emerge. Specifically, there was consistent evidence for the convergence of political skill and charisma between self and supervisor reports with significant convergent validity coefficients ranging from .18 for apparent sincerity to .40 for social astuteness. More importantly, 3 of the 5 dimensions of interest (social astuteness, interpersonal influence, and charisma) demonstrated coefficients higher than .30 between self and supervisor ratings. Taken together, these findings provide evidence that there is some level of agreement regarding employee political skill between self and supervisor reports. Evidence of agreement across sources lends support to the assertion that self-reported political skill and charisma tap important elements of interpersonal effectiveness that may be indicative of future performance ratings.

Interestingly, we found that the convergent validity coefficients between self-reports and reports from *others* to be comparable to the validity coefficients between coworker and supervisor reports for the four political skill dimensions. These data are inconsistent with past research attempting to demonstrate the convergence of

performance ratings across sources. For example, research efforts testing the multi-source convergence of both OCB and overall performance ratings tend to yield higher validity coefficients for ratings between sources external to the target (e.g. supervisor-coworker) than for coefficients of self-other reports (e.g. Allen et al., 2000; Becker & Vance, 1993; Harris & Schaubroeck, 1988). Past findings suggest that individuals external to an employee have higher agreement regarding employee performance than they do with the employee's perception of their own performance. Although, this trend of results was found for the convergence of OCB, task performance, and overall performance ratings in Study Two of the current research, the PSI dimensions failed to demonstrate the same pattern of convergence.

One possible explanation for why this trend failed to emerge for ratings of political skill could be linked to limitations in our coworker sample and a tendency for political skill levels to be audience specific. Our sampling instructions requested supervisors to select coworker participants that *worked closely* with the target employee. Consistent with these instructions, and feedback we received from supervisors, coworkers were selected on a basis of how often they interacted with the target worker. This produced a coworker sample consisting of participants that were either lateral or subordinate to the target. While we contend that political behavior can be exercised up, down, and across the chain-of-command, we also believe the appropriate selection and expression of these behaviors vary based on the *status* or level of the individual an employee intends to influence. We also believe that an employee's motivation or *will* to exercise political skill may vary as a function of the status or power of the individual or

audience being addressed. Accordingly, a discrepancy in the rank or organizational level of a coworker participant, in comparison to the target employee, may result in varied perspectives of the target's political skill and charisma, thus causing coworker-supervisor agreement to be deflated.

Evidence for Criterion-Related Validity

A third focus of the present research was to examine the criterion-related validity of self-reported political skill and charisma. As expected, Study 2 provided evidence for the ability of political skill and charisma to predict supervisor reports of task performance ($R^2 = .104$) and overall performance ($R^2 = .091$). However, contrary to our expectations, charisma and political skill only accounted for a marginal portion of the variance in supervisor ratings of OCB ($R^2 = .061$). On a positive note, when inspecting the individual OCB dimensions tapped by the Borman et al.'s (1994) behaviorally anchored rating scale (i.e. initiative, adaptability, dependability, cooperation, and integrity), only dimensions of dependability and integrity failed to yield significant correlations with charisma and/or PSI total scores. Based on these findings, an argument could be made that the extent to which political skill and charisma predict supervisor ratings of OCB is dependent upon the type of citizenship behavior being assessed. Our results indicate that political skill and charisma predict supervisor ratings of initiative, adaptability, and cooperation just as well they predict overall performance and task performance dimensions including job knowledge, task proficiency, productivity, problem solving, and oral/written communication.

In regard to coworker-reported criteria, we found very little support for the ability of political skill or charisma to predict performance ratings. The same issues we believe are responsible for the weak convergence of supervisor and coworker ratings of the political skill dimensions may also be at play in this context. Since our coworker sample consisted of individuals in positions that were either lateral or subordinate to the target participant, the organizational level of the coworker may have influenced the target employee's selection and expression of political behavior. It's possible that an employee's level of political skill may vary when attempting to influence audiences spanning different ranks in the chain-of-command. In addition, employees, regardless of their level of political skill, may fluctuate in their motivation to exercise appropriate and effective political behaviors depending on the status or power of the individual they are attempting to influence. Fluctuations in target workers' skill level or motivation as a function of the organizational level of their coworkers could have resulted in lower correlations between ratings of performance and either political skill or charisma.

When examining the criterion-related validity of political skill and charisma at the dimensional level, we observed an interaction between charisma and social astuteness when predicting supervisor reports of task and overall performance. Ferris et al. projected political skill as a "potentially important moderator that should facilitate the effectiveness of influence tactics on performance" (pp. 148, 2005). Consistent with this hypothesis, recent research has provided evidence for the moderating effects of political skill when regressing performance ratings on several impression management tactics (Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2007). Harris et al. found that politically skilled

individuals using impression management tactics including supplication, intimidation, ingratiation, self-promotion, and exemplification achieved higher performance ratings than individuals who used the same tactics but were not politically skilled. In the present research, however, we found the interaction between charisma and social astuteness to be counteractive rather than complimentary. Our results indicate that social astuteness has more influence in predicting task and overall performance for employees low in charisma than for employees high in charisma. Rather than facilitating the effect of charisma on performance ratings, our findings suggest that social astuteness serves as an alternative or substitute to charismatic behavior. We believe this finding provides additional support for the argument that charisma is a unique element of political skill, not simply an influence tactic or stylistic mechanism already captured within Ferris et al.'s four-factor taxonomy.

As an addition to Study 2, we also tested the criterion-related validity of the TKIM. Our objective in doing so was to competitively test the predictive validity of the TKIM, the PSI, and our measure of charisma. Contrary to past research examining the predictive validity of the TKIM (e.g. Wagner & Sternberg, 1991), our results failed to indicate a positive relationship between TKIM scores and performance ratings, regardless of reporting source. The only exception to this pattern was a modest correlation ($r = .20$) between TKIM scores and supervisor reports of overall performance. One possible explanation for these findings could be the result of using an abridged version of the measure. In an effort to reduce the length of study materials, we only used five of the nine situational stems found in the complete version of the TKIM. If all nine vignettes

had been administered to target participants, validity coefficients between TKIM scores and study criteria may have been enhanced. Also of note, despite the conceptual overlap of tacit knowledge and political skill, the TKIM did not correlate significantly with either PSI total scores or charisma. Although tacit knowledge is theoretically similar to constructs of political skill and charisma, our results indicate that the TKIM does not assess the same facets of social effectiveness as the PSI or our measure of charisma. What's more, our findings suggest that both political skill and charisma are more predictive of performance ratings than tacit knowledge.

Limitations and Future Directions

Like all empirical studies, the present research was not without methodological limitations. As previously mentioned, Study 1 findings are limited in their generalizability due to the use of a student sample. The second study's coworker sample produced unforeseen variance in regard to coworker organizational level in comparison to the rank of target workers. Also in Study 2, estimates of the TKIM's criterion-related validity are limited in their generalizability due to the use of an abridged version of the measure. Despite these shortcomings, the current research provided a wealth of validation evidence for both the PSI and our new measure of charisma. However, in order to increase our confidence in the stability of the current findings, additional research is needed to replicate these results across diverse populations spanning organizations in both the public and private sectors.

Pfeffer (1981) was the first to argue the notion of political behavior being driven by elements of both *skill* and *will*. Following this stream of thought, we believe that

political behaviors demand competence in reading political cues and selecting effective strategies, as well as the motivation to successfully execute strategies in order to achieve desired outcomes. Political skill enthusiasts (e.g. Ferris et al., 2002; 2005) have advanced the study of political behavior by operationalizing the skill and perceptual components of the construct. As of yet, however, researchers have not explored the motivational factors soliciting the expression of political behaviors measured by the PSI. We contend that there may be variance in political skill when considering the rank, status, or power held by the individual one intends to influence. Future research efforts need to examine the audience characteristics that solicit the effective and ineffective use of political skill (e.g. organizational rank, access to fiscal resources, access to human capital, expertise, leadership style, etc.). Likewise, future research also needs assess the specific organizational or situational factors (e.g. value of outcome, team membership, decision-making process, etc.) and employee traits (e.g. charisma, need for achievement, positive affectivity, etc.) that facilitate efforts to exercise political skill within and across organizational levels.

Beyond efforts to explore the antecedents of political skill and provide additional validity evidence for the PSI, researchers and practitioners need to explore new ways of measuring political skill for purposes of employee selection and promotion. Riggio and Riggio's (2001) chapter on *interpersonal sensitivity* highlights the usefulness of measuring self-reported social effectiveness constructs for purposes of assessment and development. In the realm of employee development, these types of assessments may be valid if employees are motivated to provide honest responses in an effort to obtain

accurate performance feedback. It should be noted, however, Likert-based self assessments are vulnerable to rating inflation. In the scope of employee selection or promotion, candidates will likely inflate Likert-based, self-reports of social effectiveness in order to be perceived as *putting the best foot forward*. To counteract socially desirable responses, self-report assessments of political skill need to be expanded to include formats that are less susceptible to faking such as SJTs, assessment center exercises, or behavioral-based interview questions.

Finally, as discussed by Ferris, Perrewé, and Douglas (2002), the job performance literature has become saturated with an abundance of social effectiveness constructs, most of which are hypothesized to enhance job performance or organizational effectiveness. These constructs include social intelligence, emotional intelligence, political skill, and prosocial work behavior, just to name a few. Clearly, research is needed to supplement ongoing efforts to understand the commonalities of these social constructs and to identify which these constructs represent unique elements of social effectiveness.

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Appendices

Appendix A. Ferris et al. (2005) Political Skill Inventory (PSI)

Using the following 7-point scale, please indicate how much you agree with each statement about yourself.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>		
<u>Social Astuteness:</u>							
1. I always seem to instinctively know the right thing to say or do to influence others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I have good intuition or “savvy” about how to present myself to others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I am particularly good at sensing the motivations and hidden agendas of others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I pay close attention to people’s facial expressions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I understand people very well.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Interpersonal Influence:</u>							
6. It is easy for me to develop good rapport with most people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. I am able to make most people feel comfortable and at ease around me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. I am able to communicate easily and effectively with others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. I am good at getting people to like me.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Networking Ability:</u>							
10. I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. At work, I know a lot of important people and am well connected.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. I am good at using my connections and networks to make things happen at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. I have developed a large network of colleagues and associates at work who I can call on for support when I really need to get things done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. I spend a lot of time at work developing connections with others.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I am good at building relationships with influential people at work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Apparent Sincerity:</u>							
16. It is important that people believe I am sincere in what I say and do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. I try to show a genuine interest in other people.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. When communicating with others, I try to be genuine in what I say and do.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix B. Charisma Item Pool

Using the following 7-point scale, please indicate how much you agree with each statement about yourself.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>		
<u>Conger & Kanungo (1994) C-K Vision and Articulation</u>							
1. I'm an exciting public speaker	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I'm a skillful performer when presenting to a group	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I'm inspirational and able to motivate by articulating effectively the importance of what organizational members are doing.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I have vision and often bring up ideas about possibilities for the future.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I provide inspiring strategic and organizational goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. I consistently generate new ideas for the future of the organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Strange & Mumford (2002) Examples of Charisma (Modified)</u>							
7. I act according to a certain "vision" that specifies a better future state.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. I strive toward distal rather than proximate goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. I communicate messages that contain reference to my overall vision.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. I personally model the values implied by the vision I set forth.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. I express high performance expectations to those I work with.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. I express confidence that my coworkers have the ability to perform at high levels.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. I will sacrifice my time, resources, or reputation at the expense of my work vision.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. I back up my requests with justification based on the goodness of my vision.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. I care about my image and will play to the desires of influential coworkers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. I have a genuine interest in the preferences of my coworkers.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. I am motivated and rewarded when my work vision is realized.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. I take into account the needs of the organization when making my work decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. I try to positively reward or reinforce coworkers for performing in line with my goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix B: (Continued)

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>		
20. I delegate authority to my coworkers regarding work tasks in line with my goals/vision.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. I am flexible in changing my work goals to meet the needs of my coworkers and organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. At work, I exude confidence and a sense of purpose.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
23. I interact closely with my coworkers when giving direction or attempting to influence them.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Additional Charisma Items</u>							
24. I am expressive with my face and hands when supporting my ideas.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
25. I encourage those I work with to share ownership of my ideas.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
26. I formulate my vision based on critical organizational goals.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
27. I demonstrate to my coworkers how committed I am to my ideas.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
28. I'm willing to take accountability for both good and bad outcomes that result from my ideas.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix C. Motowidlo and Van Scotter's (1994) 16-item scale of OCB

While performing his or her job, how likely is it that this person would...

	<u>Not at all likely</u>					<u>Extremely likely</u>	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Comply with instructions even when supervisors are not present.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Cooperate with others in the team.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Persist in overcoming obstacles to complete a task.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Display proper company appearance and manner.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Volunteer for additional responsibilities.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Follow standard operating procedures and avoid unauthorized shortcuts.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Look for challenging assignments.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Offer to help others accomplish their work.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Pay close attention to important details.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Defend the supervisor's decisions.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Render proper business courtesy.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Support and encourage a coworker with a problem.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Take the initiative to solve a work task.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Exercise personal discipline and self-control.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Tackle a difficult work assignment enthusiastically	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Voluntarily do more than the job requires to help others or contribute to company effectiveness.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix D. Snyder's (1987) 18 Item Measure of Self-Monitoring

Indicate whether each of the following statements about you are primarily true or false.

	<u>True</u>	<u>False</u>
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (F)	T	F
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like. (F)	T	F
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. (F)	T	F
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. (T)	T	F
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. (T)	T	F
6. I would probably make a good actor. (T)	T	F
7. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention. (T)	T	F
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. (T)	T	F
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. (F)	T	F
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be. (T)	T	F
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or win their favor. (F)	T	F
12. I have considered being an entertainer. (T)	T	F
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. (F)	T	F
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. (F)	T	F
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. (F)	T	F
16. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite as well as I should. (F)	T	F
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). (T)	T	F
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. (T)	T	F

Appendix E. Chao et al.'s (1994) Political Savvy Factor of Socialization

Using the following 7-point scale, please indicate how much you agree with each statement about yourself at work.

	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>			<u>Strongly Agree</u>			
1. I have learned how things “really work” on the inside of this organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. I know who the most influential people are in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. I do not have a good understanding of the politics in my organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. I am not always sure what needs to be done to get the most desirable work assignments in my area.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. I have a good understanding of the motives behind the actions of other people in the organization.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. I can identify the people in this organization who are most important to getting the work done.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Appendix F. Strahan & Gerbasi's (1972) 10-item Measure of Social Desirability

	<u>True</u>	<u>False</u>
1. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T)	T	F
2. I like to gossip at times. (F)	T	F
3. I never resent being asked to return a favor. (T)	T	F
4. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F)	T	F
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (F)	T	F
6. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T)	T	F
7. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. (F)	T	F
8. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T)	T	F
9. I always try to practice what I preach. (T)	T	F
10. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (F)	T	F

Appendix G. Job Performance BARS (Borman, Ackerman & Kubisiak, 1994)

Task Performance

Job Knowledge:

| Does not know many aspects of own job; is not knowledgeable about methods, procedures, equipment etc., related to own job.

1 2

| Knows own job reasonably well; is knowledgeable about methods, procedures, equipment, etc., regarding own job, but is not considered an expert.

3 4

| Knows own job “inside and out;” is very knowledgeable about methods, procedures, equipment, etc., as appropriate for successful job performance.

5 6 7

Task Proficiency:

| Displays poor technical proficiency; is inaccurate in own work, often makes mistakes or errors, and work products may lack quality.

1 2

| Performs most technical tasks with reasonable competence; is generally accurate in own work, typically avoids mistakes or errors, and produces sound products.

3 4

| Displays considerable mastery of all work tasks; is very accurate in own work, consistently avoids mistakes or errors, and produces very high quality products.

5 6 7

Effort and Productivity:

| Is often late in completing work; may put forth little effort, display poor work habits, or allow even minor obstacles, distractions, etc., to interfere with task completion; produces a low quantity of work.

1 2

| Is typically on time in completing tasks; usually works hard, but slacks off at times; produces average quantity of work; for the most part, overcomes obstacles, distractions, etc., to complete the work.

3 4

| Completes all work tasks efficiently and in a timely manner; puts forth considerable effort to complete a high quantity of work; overcomes obstacles, distractions, etc., to complete the work.

5 6 7

Judgment and Problem Solving:

| Tends to make poor decisions when confronted with a problem; is often inaccurate at sizing up situations or problems and ineffective at choosing a course of action.

1 2

| For the most part, makes good decisions toward solving problems; accurately assesses most situations or problems and usually determines an effective course of action.

3 4

| Consistently makes good decisions toward solving even difficult, complex problems; is always accurate at assessing situations or problems and consistently determines an effective course of action (e.g. may show excellent judgment in interpreting work rules, procedures, etc.).

5 6 7

Appendix G. (Continued)

Oral and Written Communication:

1 | Does not explain things well, orally or in writing, so that supervisors, coworkers, etc., are often confused or do not understand what is being communicated; has trouble with listening skills.

3 | Generally speaks and writes satisfactorily to the standards of the job; expresses self clearly enough to be understood most of the time; shows reasonably good listening skills.

7 | Communicates very effectively, both orally and in written form, as appropriate for job; expresses self very clearly so that he/she is always understandable; consistently demonstrates excellent listening skills.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Citizenship Performance

Initiative:

1 | Shows little or no interest in new/additional job assignments and responsibilities; never volunteers suggestions for improvements, new ways to accomplish tasks, etc.

3 | Is willing to take on new/additional job assignments and responsibilities, but does not actively seek them out; sometimes gets involved to make suggestions for improvements, new ways to accomplish tasks, etc.

7 | Consistently seeks new/additional job assignments, responsibilities, and challenges; is definitely a self-starter; often gets involved to make good suggestions for improvements, new ways to accomplish tasks, etc.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Adaptability:

1 | Has considerable trouble adapting to any organizational changes; may be inflexible about change or otherwise react poorly to stress, setbacks, frustrations, etc., brought on by changes.

3 | Is reasonably flexible in adapting to changes in technology, supervision, the job or organization, etc.; in most situations, responds well to stress, setbacks, or frustrations related to change.

7 | Very effectively adapts to changes in technology, supervision, the organization, etc.; always responds well and reacts constructively to stress, setbacks, or frustrations related to change.

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Dependability:

1 | Often arrives late for work, appointments, etc., and may fail to follow important organization rules and procedures; has discipline problems on the job and does not work very reliably even when supervisor is present.

3 | For the most part, follows attendance rules and complies with regulations, procedures, etc., is reasonably responsible and well disciplined at work, especially when supervisor is present.

7 | Always conforms to organization attendance rules, and follows regulations, procedures, etc.; can always be counted on to show a high degree of responsibility and personal discipline and to work reliably with minimal or no supervision.

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About the Author

David Coole received his Bachelor's Degree in Psychology from Central Michigan University in 2000 and an M.A. in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from the University of South Florida in 2004. Following his M.A., Mr. Coole entered the Ph.D. program at the University of South Florida.

As a doctoral candidate, Mr. Coole worked with the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute, Florida's Department of Education, and the Hillsborough County Civil Service Board (HCCSB), and also consulted on several contracts spanning both the public and private sectors. Throughout his candidacy, he remained active in the I/O research community and presented multiple posters and symposiums at national conventions of the Society of Industrial/Organizational Psychology and the Academy of Management. Mr. Coole is currently employed by HCCSB as a Personnel Research Specialist and works in areas of selection, assessment, and employee development.